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NORTH CAROLINA,
JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION,
AND THE RESISTANCE TO REFORM*
TAMAR R. B1RCKHEAD**

North Carolinais the only state in the United States that treats all
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults when they are charged
with criminal offenses and then denies them the ability to appeal
for return to the juvenile system. Thirty-seven states cap juvenile
court jurisdictionat age eighteen, while ten do so at seventeen. In
addition, as reflected by international treaties and instruments,
many nations of the world consider eighteen to be the most
appropriateage for delineating between juvenile and adult court
jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the consequences of North
Carolina's scheme for prosecuting minors can be particularly
severe. The approximately 26,000 sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds who are convicted each year in North Carolina's criminal
court system encounter significant barriers when attempting to
secure employment or access higher education. According to
empirical research, a less punitive approach to youth crime
lowers recidivism rates and better protects public safety. Further,
providing intensive probationarysupervision and rehabilitation
to young offenders, rather than incarceratingthem with adults, is
consistent with recent findings in the areas of brain development
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and adolescent psychology. Nonetheless, resistance to raisingthe
age of juvenile court jurisdiction in North Carolina has been
steadfast, with vocal opposition from law enforcement and
prosecutors.
This Article examines the repeated attempts by advocates and
lawmakers to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdictionin North
Carolina. Grounded in primary source materials and legislative
records, the Article demonstrates that there has been a recurring
pattern over the past century: despite the backing of scholars,
child welfare experts, and prominent legislators, proposals to
extend jurisdictionfrom age sixteen to ages seventeen or eighteen
have been consistently defeated. Although the precise reasons
for North Carolina'srefusal to join the majority are difficult, if
not impossible, to identify, this Article suggests several likely
causes: the self-perpetuating claim by opponents of raising the
age that an already-underfundedsystem should not be expanded;
the enduring power of the specter of youth violence; and the
continued reluctance of the bench and bar to view juvenile court
as a critical forum requiring specialization and commitment
from its participants, rather than a mere training ground for
inexperienced judges and lawyers. Finally, the Article argues
that an appreciationand understanding of the historical context
should cause lawmakers to revisit the issue with a greatersense of
urgency, providing them with the momentum needed to break
with the status quo and to raise the age of juvenile court
jurisdictionin North Carolina.
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INTRODUCTION

North Carolina is the only state in the United States that treats
all sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as adults when they are charged
with criminal offenses and then denies them the ability to appeal for
return to the juvenile system.' While two other states-Connecticut
and New York-currently end juvenile court jurisdiction at age
sixteen, Connecticut has passed legislation that will extend it to
eighteen beginning in 2009.2 In addition, both states have laws that
significantly lessen the otherwise harsh impact of adult prosecution
on offenders younger than twenty-one, including statutes that allow
for "youthful offender status," enabling a sentencing judge to defer
judgment for offenders younger than twenty-one for a period of
intensive supervision and rehabilitative services; 3 "reverse waiver," a
mechanism by which younger juveniles can readily appeal their
transfer to adult court;4 and "blended sentencing," allowing courts to

1. See MELANIE KING & LINDA SZYMANSKI, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE
JUSTICE, STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES (2006), http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/

overviews/upperage.asp (reporting that only three states in the United States-North
Carolina, New York, and Connecticut-end original juvenile court jurisdiction in
delinquency matters at age sixteen); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2200, 2203 (2007)
(delineating North Carolina's laws regarding transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile to
superior court for thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-olds); In re Bunn, 34 N.C. App.
614, 616, 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977) (holding that the decision to transfer a juvenile case to
superior court is solely within the "sound discretion" of the district court judge, the
exercise of which discretion is not subject to review "in the absence of a showing of gross
abuse").
2. See 2007 Conn. Pub. Acts 07-4 (raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from
sixteen to eighteen effective July 1, 2009); see also H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile or Adult
Jurisdiction? Age Changes in the States, 13 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 1-2, 6 (Dec.-Jan. 2008)
(discussing the Connecticut enactment).
3. Connecticut and New York each have several statutes related to youthful offender
status. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-76b to -76o (2007), amended by 2008 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 08-32 (H.B. 5748) (West) (Sections 54-76b, -76c, and -761 have been amended to
reflect the 2008 supplement to the general statutes and do not affect substance for the
purposes of this Article.); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 720.10 to .20 (2007); CAMPAIGN FOR
YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR 36 (2007), http://www.campaign
see
also
foryouthjustice.org/Downloads/NEWS/National-Report-consequences.pdf;
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM app. B at B4, B-23, & B-24 (2d ed. 2004) ("Chart of Selected State Statutes").
4. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127(b) (2007) ("The court sitting for the regular criminal
docket may return any such case to the docket for juvenile matters not later than ten
working days after the date of the transfer for proceedings in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75 (2007) (allowing for
"reverse waiver" or removal of a criminal case to juvenile court under specified
circumstances); CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing the
availability of reverse waiver in Connecticut).
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impose juvenile dispositions concurrent with adult sentences for
6
serious juvenile offenders.' North Carolina has no such provisions.
In fact, North Carolina has been in the minority on this issue for

decades.

In 1946, North Carolina was one of only four states with

sixteen as the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction, while the
remainder extended jurisdiction up to ages seventeen through twentyone, with the majority capping it at eighteen.7

Similarly, in 2007,

thirty-seven states capped juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen,
while ten did so at seventeen, leaving North Carolina in the bottom

rung with New York and Connecticut.8 North Carolina has not only
been out of step with the majority of states, but it has been and
continues to be at variance with the American Bar Association
Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency, which recommend

eighteen as the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction.9 In
5. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-133(c)
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra

(2007) (allowing for blended sentencing);
note 3, at 36 (discussing the availability of
blended sentencing in Connecticut). New York does not have blended sentencing laws.
PATRICK GRIFFIN, NAT'L CTR FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, TRYING & SENTENCING
JUVENILES AS ADULTS 3 (2003), available at http://ncjj.servehttp.com/NCJJWebsite/pdf/

transferbulletin.pdf.
6. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 71-73 (discussing the lack of
such provisions in North Carolina); Roger Ghatt & Seth Turner, New Report Highlights
the Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Facilities and Strategies for Reform, SHERIFF
MAC. 60, 62 (Winter 2008) (stating that, of the three states to cap juvenile court
jurisdiction at sixteen, North Carolina is the only one that lacks an appeals process by
which sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds can petition for return to the juvenile court);
GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 3; cf. N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2603 (2007) (allowing for immediate
appeal of the decision to transfer thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen-year-olds from juvenile to
superior court).
7. See WILEY BRITTON SANDERS, JUVENILE COURTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 6 & n.5

(1948) (citing a 1946 chart of juvenile court jurisdictional ages for each state in the United
States).
8. See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT ON STUDY OF

YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS, S.L. 2006-248, 8, app. C.1 (2007), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/yo-finalreporttolegislatur
e.pdf (reporting the age at which an offender enters adult court jurisdiction in each state in
the United States).
9. See JOHN M. JUNKER, INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY & SANCTIONS 14-17 (1980) ("Subsection A. also

limits juvenile court jurisdiction to persons not more than seventeen years old at the time
of the alleged offense. Because the rate and degree of maturation is variable among
young persons, any upper age limit on juvenile court jurisdiction is bound to be arbitrary.
The proposed standard adopts the age limits most commonly contained in existing
legislation on the ground that, in the absence of other controlling criteria, uniformity
ought to be encouraged."); STEVEN SALTZBURG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION AM. BAR
ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1-3 (Feb. 2008) (recommending eighteen
as the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction, as this is consistent with the ABA's
long history of recognizing that youth under eighteen who are involved in the justice
system should be treated differently than those who are eighteen or older).
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addition, a recent national poll of likely voters revealed that a clear
majority of the public believes that putting youth under eighteen in
adult correctional facilities makes them more likely to commit future

crime; that the decision to try youth under eighteen in adult courts
should be made on a case-by-case basis; and that spending on
rehabilitative services and treatment for youth, rather than
incarcerating them with adults, will ultimately save tax dollars. 0

On the international front, various treaties and instruments
confirm that many nations consider eighteen to be the most
appropriate age for delineating between juvenile and adult court

jurisdiction."

For instance, the United Nations Convention on the

Rights of the Child, signed by the United States but not ratified,
defines "child" as meaning "every human being below the age of
eighteen years."' 2 Similarly, while rules of the United Nations related

to juvenile justice concede that age limits for juvenile court will
depend on the "economic, social, political, cultural and legal systems"
of each member state,13 these instruments also contain aspirational
language suggesting that age eighteen should be the dividing line

between juvenile and adult jurisdiction. 4 Further, in countries as
diverse as Belgium,15 Canada,

6

China, 7 the Czech Republic, 8

10. BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARDS YOUTH CRIME AND THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM, 2-6 (Feb 2007), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/zogby-feb07.pdf;
see also Ghatt & Turner, supra note 6, at 64-65 (citing the 2007 poll which was released by
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and conducted by Zogby International).
11. See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
12. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Art. 1,
Annex, at 167, U.N. GAOR 44'" Sess., Supp. No 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989)
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (signed by the United States on Feb. 16, 1995, but not
ratified).
13. See, e.g., United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules"), G.A. Res. 40/33, R. 2.2 Comment., Annex, at 207,
U.N. GAOR 40" Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985) (acknowledging
that there may be a wide variety of ages coming under the definition of "juvenile," ranging
from seven years to eighteen years or above).
14. See, e.g., United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their
Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, at 205, T II, U.N. GAOR 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A,
U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990) ("A juvenile is every person under the age of 18.").
15. See Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in InternationalJuvenile Justice: What Conclusions
Can be Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 505, 516 (Josine
Junger-Tas & Scott H. Decker eds., 2006).
16. See Maureen McGuire, An Act to Amend the Young Offenders Act and the
Criminal Code-Getting Tougher?, 39 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 186 (1997).
17. See CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & STUART J. MILLER, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 404 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the juvenile justice system in China).
18. See Junger-Tas, supra note 15, at 519.
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France,19 Northern Ireland,2" Scandinavia,"1 South Africa,"2
Switzerland, 3 and the United Kingdom, 4 the upper age limit for the
jurisdiction of juvenile or youth court is eighteen, while several other
countries-including Austria, Germany, Lithuania, and Spain-place
all offenders younger than twenty-one under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.25
Given the near unanimity of policymakers at the national and
international levels on this issue, it is not surprising that advocates
have advanced compelling arguments for raising the age in North
Carolina, a state many consider one of the more "progressive" in the
South.26 Principal among these arguments is that the collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction can be severe, with studies
documenting that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds with criminal
records encounter significant barriers to employment and higher
education. 7 Further, empirical research shows that a less punitive
approach to youth crime lowers recidivism rates and better protects
public safety."
In addition, providing intensive probationary
supervision and rehabilitation to young offenders, rather than
incarcerating them with adults, is consistent with recent findings in
the areas of brain development and adolescent psychology.29
Nonetheless, resistance to raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction in North Carolina has been steadfast, with legislative and
archival research revealing a recurring pattern: while advocates and
policymakers have long understood that juvenile court should include
all offenders under age eighteen, their reform efforts have

19. See id. at 515-16.
20. Id. at 515.
21. Id. at 520-21 (stating that, while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland do not
have a separate juvenile justice system, they have measures specially addressed to
offenders aged fifteen through seventeen that "result in a more lenient outcome for this
age group").
22. See BARTOLLAS & MILLER, supra note 17, at 401 (discussing the juvenile justice
system in South Africa).
23. See Junger-Tas, supra note 15, at 518.
24. See id. at 513.
25. Id. at 516.
26. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, In North Carolina,the New South Rubs Uneasily with
the Old Ways, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1990, at Al (characterizing North Carolina as "the most
progressive state in the South"); Carol Byrne Hall, Nobody is Neutral About the Senator,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 23, 2001, at 12A (stating that North Carolina
has "long been viewed as one of the most progressive Southern states").
27. See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
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consistently been defeated.3" In 1919, for instance, legislation was
passed to provide for a statewide juvenile court system with
The
jurisdiction over children aged eighteen and younger.3
legislation, entitled "The Juvenile Court Statute of 1919," was
adopted as presented, except for one notable revision: juvenile court
jurisdiction would end once a child reached age sixteen.32 While there
is little direct explanation for this eleventh-hour shift in policy, given
that no state monies were appropriated for implementation, the
answer appears to lie in the refusal of lawmakers to endorse a system
that lacked necessary funding, personnel, and resources from the
state.33 This same pattern-wherein well-considered proposals to
extend the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to eighteen have
consistently failed to bring about change-has recurred every two or
three decades over the past hundred years.34
This Article examines the repeated attempts by advocates and
lawmakers to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in North
Carolina. Part I establishes that the stakes for North Carolina are
high, as tens of thousands of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are
convicted each year in the state's criminal courts. The first Section
demonstrates that young people who are convicted encounter
significant barriers when attempting to secure jobs or gain access to
higher education. The second Section establishes, based on empirical
research, that a less punitive approach to youth crime lowers
recidivism rates and better protects public safety. The third Section
asserts that providing intensive probationary supervision and
rehabilitation to young offenders, rather than incarcerating them with
adults, is consistent with recent findings in the areas of brain
development and adolescent psychology.
Part II considers the nature of the opposition to raise the age,
demonstrating that it comes from a number of different sources and
directions-none of which would have likely been successful on its
30. See generally BETTY GENE ALLEY & JOHN THOMAS WILSON, NORTH
CAROLINA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A HISTORY, 1868-1993 (1994) (discussing the

history of juvenile justice in North Carolina and the repeated, failed attempts to raise the
age of juvenile court jurisdiction).
31. Id. at 4; see also Law of March 3, 1919, Ch. 97, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 243; MASON
A BRIEF HISTORY; AND JUVENILE
THOMAS, JUVENILE CORRECTIONS:
JURISDICTION: NORTH CAROLINA'S LAWS AND RELATED CASES 5-10 (1972).
32. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 4-5; see also infra notes 143-45 and
P.

accompanying text (discussing the Juvenile Court Statute of 1919).
33. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30 at 4-5.
34. Id. at 18, 22-25, 28, 40, 46; see also infra Part III (discussing the pattern whereby
legislative proposals to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction have been put forward
and rejected at regular intervals since 1915).
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own but together have checked the expansion of juvenile court
jurisdiction. The first Section examines the apparent lack of public
support for full funding of the state's juvenile courts and hence the
repeated refusal of the North Carolina General Assembly to
appropriate the monies needed to extend jurisdiction. The second
Section discusses the objections expressed by police and prosecutors,
from the assertion that "coddling" sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
offenders in juvenile court will send the wrong message and increase
crime rates, to the claim that applying the due process protections of
the Juvenile Code to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds will place an
undue burden upon prosecuting attorneys.
Part III documents the recurring defeat of proposals to raise the
age, despite the backing of scholars, child welfare experts, and
prominent lawmakers. The first Section examines the establishment
of a statewide system of juvenile courts during the 1920s and '30s, and
the opposition of various constituencies, including county
administrators who were unwilling to provide adequate funding for
court personnel and judges who resisted the court's emphasis on
rehabilitation rather than punishment. The second Section examines
the post-World War II years during which a diverse collection of
advocates advanced compelling arguments to raise the age, all of
which were ultimately rejected. The third Section demonstrates that
resistance to raising the age has continued to the present day despite
organized efforts and reasoned advocacy, leaving North Carolina-in
some respects-with the harshest juvenile court laws in the United
States.35
Although the precise reasons for North Carolina's refusal to join
the majority are difficult, if not impossible, to identify, Part IV
the self-perpetuating claim by
suggests several likely causes:
opponents of raising the age that an already-underfunded system
should not be expanded; the enduring power of the specter of youth
violence; and the continued reluctance of the bench and bar to view
juvenile court as a critical forum requiring specialization and
commitment from its participants, rather than a mere training ground
for inexperienced judges and lawyers. Finally, the Article argues that
an appreciation and understanding of the historical context should
35. See Shannon Peluso, House Considers Juvenile Crimes Bill, News 14 Carolina,
July 14, 2007, http://newsl4.com/Default.aspx?ArID=584826 (last visited Aug. 28, 2008)

(reporting that N.C. Rep. Alice Bordsen, a sponsor of a bill to allow sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old first-time nonviolent offenders to expunge their records, stated that,
even if the bill did pass, North Carolina would still have "the harshest laws for juvenile
offenders" in the United States).
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cause lawmakers to revisit the issue with a greater sense of urgency,

providing them with the momentum needed to break with the status
quo and to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in North
Carolina.
I. WHAT IS AT STAKE?

The question of where to set the upper age limit of juvenile court
jurisdiction raises many broader issues. Among these are the
definitions of child, juvenile, and adult;36 the appropriate role of the
state vis-A-vis children and families;37 and the extent to which the
juvenile court's emphasis should be on treatment and rehabilitation
rather than punishment.3 8 The question also touches on more

fundamental concerns, such as whether a separate juvenile justice
system might harm the very population it was intended to serve,3 9 and
whether it is futile from a developmental perspective to set arbitrary
age boundaries that fail to account for variations in children's

culpability.

°

While much has been written on each of these topics,

36. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids and Crime, 36
B.C. L. REV. 953, 1018-21 (1995) (discussing legal definitions of juvenile, adult, and child,
and the problems of drawing jurisdictional lines).
37. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children's Education?: Parents,
Children, and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1344-46 (2007) (discussing, in the context
of public education, the legitimate and potentially conflicting claims of the majority,
parents, and children).
38. See, e.g., Chauncey E. Brummer, Extended JuvenileJurisdiction: The Best of Both
Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 777 (2002) (examining the practices of extended juvenile
jurisdiction and blended sentencing, and arguing that together they would create a hybrid
system of juvenile justice, incorporating both rehabilitation and punishment); Barry C.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988) (analyzing the changing sentencing
practices in juvenile court, and arguing that the shift in emphasis from treatment to
punishment has led to the substantive and procedural criminalization of the juvenile
court).
39. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and CriminalJustice Systems' Responses to Youth
Violence, in YOUTH VIOLENCE 189, 243-50 (Mark H. Moore & Michael Tonry eds., 1998)
(advocating for an integrated criminal justice system that provides young offenders full
due process protections as well as automatic sentence reductions because of the
diminished responsibility and immaturity of youth); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68, 96-102, 113-21 (1998) (arguing that, because juvenile courts engage in
"criminal social control," states should abolish them, sentence young offenders in a unified
system, and formally recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor) [hereinafter Feld,
Sentencing Policy]; see also Junger-Tas, supra note 15, at 509-10 (citing Feld as a
criminologist who has argued for a unified criminal justice system based on the fact that
young people receive harsher and more punitive treatment in the adult system than in the
juvenile system).
40. See Feld, Sentencing Policy, supra note 39, at 121-23; Junger-Tas, supra note 15, at
510.
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there has been little if any legal scholarship on juvenile court age
jurisdiction in North Carolina or on the state's juvenile justice system
in general.41

Research
jurisdiction in
According to
approximately

confirms that raising the age of juvenile court
North Carolina will affect many young people.
statistics for the most recent year available,
66,000 sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were

processed in the adult criminal court system.42 Of those, 26,000 were
convicted, nearly half of whom were sixteen-year-olds 3 These
figures, however, do not fully reflect the total number of minors who

enter the criminal justice system each year or the number convicted,
as North Carolina also allows juveniles as young as thirteen who are
charged with felonies to be transferred to superior court for trial and
sentencing as adults." In fact, beginning in 1919, fourteen- and
fifteen-year-olds initially charged in juvenile court with felonies could
be transferred to superior court.45 Since that time, transfer to adult
court has been mandatory for some of the state's most serious
felonies.46 In 1994, the minimum age of transfer was reduced from
41. A Lexis search of law reviews and journals located only a single piece of legal
scholarship focusing on juvenile justice law and policy in North Carolina. See Mason P.
Thomas, Jr., Juvenile Justice in Transition-A New Juvenile Code for North Carolina, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Thomas, Juvenile Justice]. The same scholar
also authored an article on the history and development of reforms designed to protect
against child abuse and neglect in North Carolina. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and
Neglect Part II Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and Social Perspectives on North
Carolina,54 N.C. L. REV. 743 (1976).
42. See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 38, app. D
(reporting the numbers of juvenile and youthful (sixteen- and seventeen-year-old)
offenders processed in the North Carolina court system from July to December 2004). For
illustrative purposes, these numbers have been doubled to provide approximate figures for
a twelve-month period.
43. Id.
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2007).
45. See Law of March 3,1919, ch. 97, § 9(f), 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 247 (current version
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2007)). Felonies under North Carolina state law include
the relatively minor offenses of larceny of a dog, regardless of the value of the animal
taken (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-81(al) (2007)), and larceny of pine needles or pine straw
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-79.1 (2007)).
46. In 1919, transfer was mandatory for felonies that allowed for punishment in excess
of ten years in prison. Law of March 3, 1919, ch. 97, § 9 (f), 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 247. In
1969, this law was amended to require automatic transfer for felonies that constituted
"capital offenses" after a finding of probable cause. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-280 (1969). In
1992, the law was again amended to require automatic transfer only for "Class A" felonies,
or first-degree murder, after a probable cause finding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1992).
Current law requires automatic transfer of juveniles thirteen years of age or older in firstdegree murder cases after a finding of probable cause, and a sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole must be imposed upon conviction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B2200 (2007) ("If the alleged felony constitutes a Class A felony and the court finds
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fourteen to thirteen, giving North Carolina judges the discretion to
transfer offenders as young as thirteen from juvenile to superior court
for any felony crime. 7 After a youth is transferred to and convicted

in superior court, she must be prosecuted as an adult for any
Once
subsequent criminal charge, regardless of how minor.4"
juveniles are tried and convicted in superior court, they must serve
their sentences in adult correctional facilities.4 9

Statistics show that approximately twenty-five children aged
thirteen through fifteen are transferred to superior court in North
Carolina each year.50 While raising the age would not necessarily

probable cause, the court shall transfer the case to the superior court for trial as in the case
of adults."); § 14-17 ("[Murder perpetrated by these specified means] shall be deemed to
be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony, and ... any such person who was under 18
years of age at the time of the murder shall be punished with imprisonment in the State's
prison for life without parole.").
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1994) ("The court after notice, hearing, and a finding
of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court if the juvenile
was thirteen years of age or older at the time the juvenile allegedly committed an offense
that would be a felony if committed by an adult.") (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2200 (2007)); see also infra notes 214-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
passage of the law that lowered the age of juvenile transfer from fourteen to thirteen).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1604(b) (2007) ("A juvenile who is transferred to and
convicted in superior court shall be prosecuted as an adult for any criminal offense the
juvenile commits after the superior court conviction.").
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2204 (2007) ("Should the juvenile be found guilty, or enter
a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal offense in superior court and receive an active
sentence, then immediate transfer to the Department of Correction shall be ordered ...
The juvenile may not be detained in a [juvenile] detention facility pending transfer to the
Department of Correction."). N.C. Department of Correction policy designates certain
facilities for youthful inmates (defined as between ages thirteen and twenty-five); as of
2006, there were five facilities that housed these youth. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 6. Male felons and misdemeanants under age
nineteen are processed and incarcerated at Western Youth Institution. Id. Male felons
between nineteen and twenty-five are incarcerated in facilities separate from those
housing male felons who are twenty-five and older. Id. Male misdemeanants between
nineteen and twenty-five may be housed in the same minimum custody prisons as adult
male misdemeanants. Id. Female youthful offenders (ages thirteen to twenty-five) are
housed at the North Carolina Correctional Institution for Women. Id. But see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B- 2517 (2007) (allowing the governor to transfer juveniles convicted in superior
court from adult correctional facilities to juvenile detention facilities as long as such
placements are deemed "feasible").
50. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 23, 27 (finding
that in the fiscal year 2004-05, twenty-five offenders younger than sixteen were
transferred from the juvenile courts for trial as adults and were convicted of felonies, while
one was transferred and convicted of a misdemeanor); see also e-mail from Stan Clarkson,
of the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, to
author (Apr. 21, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that for
fiscal year 2006-07, forty-one juveniles were transferred to superior court from juvenile
court for crimes committed before age sixteen). The statistics showed that twenty-four of
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impact current North Carolina law that allows for transfer of juveniles
to adult court, many of the arguments for extending juvenile court
jurisdiction apply equally to this cohort. Further, future legislative
debate on this issue will likely include reconsideration of the laws
regarding transfer.51 Thus, because all sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds are automatically tried and sentenced as adults and because
juveniles as young as thirteen may be tried as adults, tens of
thousands of young people are burdened each year with the collateral
consequences of North Carolina's scheme for the criminal
prosecution of minors, while being denied the rehabilitative services
and programs provided by the juvenile justice system. This Part
examines the benefits of raising the jurisdictional age of juvenile court
for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds as well as the community at
large.
A.

Employment and Higher Education

When a youth is found "delinquent" of a criminal offense in
juvenile court, the "adjudication" is not a criminal conviction, and the
young person is not "guilty" of a crime.52 When sixteen- or
those transferred in 2006-07 were between thirteen and seventeen at the time of transfer,
while seven were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-one. Id.
51. See, e.g., N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 10
("Although the Commission discussed the possibility that 13 is too young for a juvenile to
assume adult responsibility for criminal actions, the Commission ultimately felt that
maintaining the current transfer mechanism ... was important as a safeguard to public
safety in appropriate cases.").
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2412 (2007) ("An adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent
or commitment of a juvenile to the Department for placement in a youth development
center shall neither be considered conviction of any criminal offense nor cause the juvenile
to forfeit any citizenship rights."); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3000(a) (2007) (stating
that all juvenile records shall be withheld from public inspection and may be examined
only by court order). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3000(e)-(f) (2007) (stating that a
juvenile's delinquency adjudication for a felony offense may be subsequently used by law
enforcement, the magistrate, and the prosecutor for pretrial release and plea negotiating
decisions in adult criminal court, and that adjudications for violent felonies may be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings for impeachment or as aggravating factors at sentencing);
John Schwade, The Danger of Too Much Secrecy on Juvenile Records, THE DURHAM
NEWS, Apr. 19, 2008, at A2 (arguing, in the wake of recent murders allegedly committed
by a youth with a juvenile court record, that criminal courts be allowed to consider
juvenile adjudications for violent offenses in sentencing for all matters in adult court, even
property crimes). See also RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT 276-78 (ALI-ABA 2007) (1991) (discussing potential

collateral criminal and civil consequences of juvenile delinquency adjudications, including
enhanced penalties for future offenses, immigration consequences, and forfeiture); Bonnie
Mangum Braudway, Scarlet Letter Punishment for Juveniles: Rehabilitation Through
Humiliation?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 63, 81 (2004) (describing the problems faced by

individuals whose juvenile court record is revealed to employers and colleges); Michael
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seventeen-year-olds are convicted of crimes in adult court, however,
the record will forever follow them, absent limited opportunities for

expungement or pardon.53 Thus, one of the strongest arguments for
raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction concerns the impact of a
criminal conviction on a youth's ability to obtain work. While it is
widely known that adults with criminal histories are automatically
excluded from many areas of employment,54 the proliferation of
criminal history background checks and the reluctance of insurance
companies to cover employers who hire convicted felons mean that
youth with criminal records also face significant obstacles securing

jobs. 5

Employers in most states can deny positions to-or even

fire-anyone with a criminal record, regardless of the individual's
history, the circumstances, or the relationship between the job or the
license sought and the applicant's criminal record. 6 Employers in
most states can also deny jobs to people who were arrested for, but
never convicted of, a crime.57 While all states have the power to lift
Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral
Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114-18 (2006) (discussing possible
collateral consequences of juvenile adjudications in the areas of housing, employment, and
education).
53. ACTION FOR CHILDREN IN NORTH CAROLINA, PUTTING THE JUVENILE BACK

IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 2 (2007), available at http://www.ncchild.org/action/images/
stories/JuvenileJusticeRaisingTheAgeBriefjfinal.pdf (stating that when sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds are convicted of any criminal offense in N.C, they will have the
criminal record "for the rest of their lives," even if they do not serve time in prison).
Under current North Carolina law, expungement is available only for one low-level felony
(simple possession of cocaine) and for misdemeanor offenses committed prior to age
eighteen, except for misdemeanor possession of alcohol or drugs. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-145 to -146 (2007).
54. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking "Rational Discrimination" Against ExOffenders, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 283, 283-86 (2006) (discussing the
discrimination faced by people with criminal histories when attempting to secure
employment and reenter society); see also Alan Rosenthal & Marsha Weissman,
Sentencing for Dollars: The FinancialConsequences of a Criminal Conviction 25-28 (Ctr.
for
Cmty.
Alternatives,
Working
Paper,
Feb.
2007),
available at
http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdfs/financial%20consequences.pdf (discussing the
financial penalties and fees imposed upon those convicted of crimes as well as coercive
collection methods that are counterproductive to reintegration).
55. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supranote 3. at 80.
56. LEGAL ACTION CENTER, AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY 10 (2004),

available
at
http://lacorg.siteprotect.net/lac/upload/lacreport/LACPrintReport.pdf
(finding that thirty-six states have no standards governing public employers' consideration
of applicants' criminal records, and that forty-five states have no standards governing
private employers). Also, twenty-nine states have no standards governing the relevance of
conviction records of applicants for occupational licenses. Id.
57. Id. (finding that thirty-seven states have laws that permit employers and
occupational licensing agencies to consider arrests that never led to conviction when
making employment decisions).
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bars to employment by issuing "certificates of rehabilitation," only six
states offer this option, North Carolina not among them.58
A second

potential

collateral consequence

of a criminal

conviction is the denial of access to higher education. Increasingly,
colleges and universities are using criminal history background checks
in the admissions process and then developing exclusionary policies
to deny admission to certain categories of applicants.59 There is no
evidence, however, that such policies increase safety on college

campuses or that an applicant's prior criminal record is a relevant risk
factor when assessing future "dangerousness. ' 60 In fact, the data
shows that college campuses have lower crime rates than in the
broader community and that students without prior criminal records

are more likely to commit crimes on campus than those who have
criminal histories.6' In addition, because the juvenile and criminal
justice systems have a disparate impact on minorities,62 policies that
58. Id. (stating that the six states that offer certificates of rehabilitation are Arizona,
California, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey and New York).
59. CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, CLOSING THE DOORS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION: ANOTHER COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 1-

2 (2008), available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdfs/Higher%20Ed%20
Paper%20Final.pdf (reporting, for instance, that the Common Application, used by more
than 300 universities and colleges, added questions about school disciplinary records and
prior criminal convictions to their 2006-07 application). Another factor compounding the
impact of the use of background checks during the college admissions process is the lack
of any consistency in their use either within states or among states. As a result, there can
be discrepancies as to whether to screen and, if so, how to use the information, even within
a single state university system. Id. at 3-4.
60. Id. at 2 ("Violent crime on campus is rare, and the few college students who are
victims of such crimes are mostly victimized off campus by strangers."). Studies have also
shown that college students are "significantly safer" than the nation as a whole and are
less likely to be victims of violent crimes than the general population. Id. Rape and sexual
assault are the only crimes for which there are no statistical differences in their
commission by college students versus non-students. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7 (reporting that, in 2004, more than one million people were convicted of
felonies in state courts, forty percent of whom were African-American, which far exceeds
their twelve percent representation in the United States population at large). There has
also been much written about the "school-to-prison pipeline," in which disparate
treatment of young people of color begins in the schools and continues at each stage of the
educational and criminal justice systems. Id.; see also MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY

AND
ETHNICITY
(2007),
available at http://sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/rd stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf (reporting on
the disproportionate rate of incarceration for African Americans and for Hispanics).
Statistics have also borne out the reality of disproportionate minority impact in North
Carolina's juvenile justice and criminal justice systems. See N.C. DEP'T OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 9, 10, 14-15 (2007),
available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/resources/pdf documents/annual-report_2007.pdf
#pagemode=bookmarks&page=l (reporting that sixty percent of juvenile delinquency
RACE
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exclude those with criminal convictions from higher education will
have a greater impact on people of color than on whites.63 As
research has shown that access to higher education lowers recidivism
rates by "opening the doors to economic and social advancement,"
excluding people from college on this basis will inevitably have a
deleterious effect on the safety of the community at large.' 4
North Carolina is among the growing number of states to be
affected by these developments. Despite the fact that its college
campuses have a crime rate that is just one-sixth of the statewide rate,
standardized questions about applicants' criminal records are asked
by all sixteen schools that comprise the University of North
Carolina's four-year system of higher public education.6" Speciallyappointed committees then review and evaluate applicants with
criminal histories prior to making admissions decisions.66 While
admissions offices within the UNC system have reported that a
criminal record does not result in an automatic denial of admission,
only five schools have an appeals process for those who are denied
admission on this basis, and just a few schools inform applicants that
their criminal record was the principal reason for the denial.67
Similarly, of the forty-four private four-year colleges in North
Carolina, thirty-eight inquire about an applicant's criminal record on
their application form.68 In contrast, the North Carolina community
college system admits all high school graduates who are at least
eighteen without regard to criminal history,69 although it has become
more common for community colleges across the United States to
complaints are given to youth of color, that sixty-seven percent of youth detained are
youth of color, and that eighty-two percent of training school commitments are for youth
of color); N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 23 (finding

that in the 2004-05 fiscal year, whites through age twenty-one accounted for thirty-six
percent of felony convictions, while people of color in the same age group accounted for
sixty-four percent).
63. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 59, at 7. Until 2006,
financial aid in the form of Pell Grants and federal student loans was denied to
approximately 50,000 to 60,000 people annually on the basis of drug convictions. Id.
64. Id.; see also infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing additional
grounds for arguing that raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction would lower
recidivism rates).
65. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 59, at 3-4; TASK
FORCE ON THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY, FINAL REPORT 4 (Dec. 14, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
66. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES, supra note 59, at 4.
67. See id.
68. Id. (stating, however, that the majority of North Carolina's private colleges inform
the applicant when a criminal conviction is the basis for denial of admission and allow for
appeal of the denial).
69. Id.
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discourage students with criminal records from entering certain
fields-like nursing-that will not license people with criminal
histories."

The collateral consequences of criminal convictions extend far
beyond the areas of employment and higher education with
immigration status, access to public housing and benefits, and
exclusion from military service being among the most significant.7 1

Similarly, the challenges and obstacles facing those who must reenter
the community following terms of incarceration cannot be
underestimated.72
B.

Recidivism and Public Safety

Advocates for raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in
North Carolina have also argued that providing intensive supervision,
meaningful treatment, and rehabilitation to sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds in juvenile court, rather than trying and incarcerating them
with adult defendants in criminal courts and prisons, would lower
recidivism rates and ultimately create safer neighborhoods and
communities.73 Youth who are tried and sentenced as adults have

been shown to receive little or no educational services, mental health
or substance abuse treatment, job training, or any other type of
rehabilitative programming,7 4 leading to "salvageable children ...
70. See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 80; LEGAL ACTION
CENTER, supra note 56, at 10; see also Ben Geiger, The Casefor Treating Ex-Offenders as
a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1202 (2006) (describing the ways in which
occupational licensing agencies take criminal histories into account in their licensing
decisions).

71. See Michael Pinard, An IntegratedPerspective on the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REV. 623, 635-36 (2006); see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 3,
at 80 (stating, in the context of a discussion of juvenile justice policy in North Carolina,
that the military excludes those with felony convictions); SEJAL ZOTA & JOHN RUBIN,
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 25-

43 (UNC School of Gov't, 2008) (stating that removal, deportation, and bars to
naturalization are among the potential immigration consequences of criminal convictions
for noncitizen defendants).
72. See generally LEGAL ACTION CENTER, supra note 56 (discussing the legal barriers

facing people with criminal records when they attempt to reenter society); Pinard, supra
note 71 (emphasizing the links between issues raised by the collateral consequences of
convictions and by reentry, and advocating for an integrated perspective when analyzing
the issues' legal and policy implications).
73. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
74. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS 2

(2006), available at http://www.act4jj.org/media/factsheets/factsheet_20.pdf;

CAMPAIGN

FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH

IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA

6-7

(2007),

available at http://www.campaignfor
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Sixteen- and

seventeen-year-olds placed in adult jails are more likely to be raped
and assaulted, and to commit suicide, than adult offenders.76 Further,
youthjustice.org/Downloads[NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing-Juveniles-Report2007-11-15.pdf (discussing the inadequacy of staffing and the lack of education and prosocial activities for adolescents in jails compared to juvenile detention facilities); Editorial,
Children in Adult Jails, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A24 (arguing that it is "barbaric" to
confine children in adult jails, as they are "at greater risk of being raped, battered or
pushed to suicide" and are "more likely to become violent criminals than children handled
through the juvenile justice system").

Compare N.C. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &

supra note 62, at 19 (finding that seventy-five percent of
youth in the North Carolina juvenile justice system have mental health needs for which
they receive intensive psychological services and that forty-three percent have substance
abuse problems for which they receive substance abuse treatment), with SENTENCING &
POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 6-7 (finding that there are only three
programs for youthful offenders in the North Carolina prison system that address such
issues as chemical dependency, post-secondary educational needs, and employability, and
that they are only offered at a few of the prisons that house youth). Also, the prisons that
serve youthful offenders offer only limited programming that addresses mental health
issues and vocational education needs. See id. at 6-7.
75. Editorial, In the Lion's Den, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 14, 1998,
at 20A. It is worth noting, however, that there are serious systemic problems within many
juvenile detention facilities and juvenile prisons in North Carolina and across the United
States. See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,

DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION
AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/

images/upload/06-11_REPDangersOfDetentionJJ.pdf (finding that, given new research
showing that detaining juveniles may not make communities safer, the costs of needlessly
detaining young people who do not need to be there are simply too high); Editorial, Harsh
Treatment for Youth Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at A16 (arguing that Texas
authorities should not allow the use of pepper spray in juvenile detention facilities);
Ashley Fantz, Sex Abuse, Violence Alleged at Teen Jails Across U.S., CNN, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/04/juvenile.jails/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2008)
(reporting accounts of violence and sexual abuse at juvenile detention facilities in
Mississippi, Texas, Ohio, Florida, and Indiana); Jordan Schrader, Juvenile Justice Appeals
for Staff, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (reporting that North Carolina's juvenile prisons need more staff and resources,
as they are challenged by "gang networks, outdated buildings and imprisoned youths'
ability to outmuscle staff"); see also infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the
failures of North Carolina's system of training schools). But see Jordan Schrader, Panel:
Raise the Juvenile Age, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.ncchild.org/action/index.php/Action-for-Children-In-The-News/December-72007-Raising-The-Age-of-Juvenile-Jurisdiction-Asheville-Citizen-Times.htm
(reporting
that while state juvenile lockups in North Carolina are not the "safest" places, advocates
assert that youth are still better off in the juvenile justice system than the adult system).
76. VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZEIDENBERG, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE RISKS JUVENILES FACE WHEN THEY ARE INCARCERATED

WITH ADULTS (1997), http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/risks/risks.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008);
see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA, supra note 74, at 10-15 (finding

that youth in adult jails are many times more likely to commit suicide, suffer long-term
consequences from isolation, and be assaulted or raped than in juvenile detention
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in 2006, only four percent of the sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
charged in North Carolina's criminal courts were convicted of
felonies against people, while eighty percent of the complaints
brought in juvenile court were misdemeanors-confirming that the
majority of crimes committed by older teens are minor offenses, more
appropriately handled in the juvenile justice system.77
Empirical research has demonstrated that violent adolescent
offenders prosecuted in adult criminal court are likely to re-offend
more quickly and more often than those adjudicated in a juvenile
court setting.78 One recent study compared the re-arrest and reincarceration rates of young offenders in New York State, where-as
in North Carolina-juveniles as young as thirteen can be charged in
adult court, with offenders in neighboring New Jersey, where nearly

facilities); Deborah Ross, A Gain for Juvenile Justice, But..., NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 1, 1998, at 31A (reporting on the physical violence experienced by
youth in adult jails).
77. Anne Blyth, When Should Teens Be Tried as Adults?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 2007, at 25A; see also N.C. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 62, at 10 (finding that, in 2007, sixty-five percent
of juvenile delinquency complaints were for minor misdemeanors, twenty-two percent
were for serious misdemeanors or less serious felonies, and only two percent were for
violent felonies); ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 53, at 6 (finding
that in 2005, approximately 11,000 youth ages sixteen and seventeen were convicted of
crimes in the adult system in North Carolina, fewer than fourteen percent of which were
for felonies, while only four percent of those were felonies against a person).
78. See, e.g., Andrea McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies
Facilitatingthe Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice
System, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 57, S14 (2007) (finding, based on empirical
evidence, that transferring juveniles to adult court and subjecting them to adult sentences
results in higher recidivism rates); Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to
Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548
(Oct. 1997) (finding, as a result of a long-term recidivism study in Florida, that transfer of
juveniles to adult criminal court is more likely to aggravate recidivism than to stem it);
Shay Bilchik, Wiser Ways on Youth Crime, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at B3 (arguing
based on a recent federal study that transferring youth to the adult criminal justice system
significantly increases crime); Editorial, Juvenile Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2007, at
A26 (arguing based on an empirical study that the practice of transferring children into
adult courts is counterproductive, "actually creating more crime than it cure[s]");
Editorial, Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2007, at A22 (arguing based on a federallybacked study that children handled in adult courts and confined in adult jails committed
more violent crime than children processed through the traditional juvenile justice
system); J. Fagan et al., Be Careful What You Wish For. Legal Sanctions and PublicSafety
Among Adolescent Felony Offenders in Juvenile and Criminal Court (Columbia Law
School, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 03-61, 2007) (finding, based on empirical analysis,
that serious adolescent offenders prosecuted in criminal court are likely to be re-arrested
more quickly and more often for violent, property and weapons offenses and are then
more often and more quickly returned to incarceration).
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all offenders under age eighteen are processed in juvenile court.79

After comparing similar offenders who were arrested and charged
with the same felony offenses during the same period, the researchers
found that adolescents in the New York adult courts were more likely
to be re-arrested; were re-arrested more quickly, more often, and for

more serious offenses; and were re-incarcerated at higher rates than
those processed in New Jersey's juvenile court system.8 ° Results of

several other recent studies have been comparable, 1 including ones
that have examined recidivism rates in North Carolina.'

Further, it

79. See MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice, The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the
Adult
Criminal Court,
5
ISSUE
BRIEF
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.macfound.org/atflcf/lB0386CE3-8B29-4162-8098-E466FB856794}/
ADJJTRANSFER.PDF.
80. Id. The study of 2,000 adolescents used two groups from the same metropolitan
area, having similar characteristics with regard to economic status, access to weapons, drug
use, gang influences, etc. Id. Results showed that youth prosecuted in New York's adult
courts were eighty-five percent more likely to be re-arrested for violent crimes and fortyfour percent more likely to be re-arrested for felony property crimes than those processed
in New Jersey's juvenile courts. Id. at 1-2.
81. See, e.g., SHAU CHANG & CRAIG A. MASON, JUVENILE SENTENCING
ADVOCACY PROJECT OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, REARREST RATES AMONG YOUTH SENTENCED IN ADULT COURT (2001), available at

http://www.pdmiami.com/JSAP_2001_Impact.Evaluation.pdf (finding in 2001 that Florida
youth who received adult sanctions were over twice as likely to reoffend by being charged
with a new criminal offense than youth who received juvenile sanctions); FLORIDA DEPT.
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, A DJJ SUCCESS STORY: TRENDS IN TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO

ADULT CRIMINAL COURT (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
Admin/Documents/publications/sl-djj.pdf (finding that youth in Florida receiving juvenile
sanctions had lower recidivism rates than those youth transferred to adult court); see also
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice, supra note 79, at 2 (finding that teens in adult correctional facilities faced harsher
settings and experienced more developmental problems than those in juvenile correctional
facilities). This study also revealed that the size and diversity of the populations in
correctional settings impact the outcome, as youth placed in larger juvenile facilities had
similar outcomes to youth in adult facilities, while youth sentenced as adults who spent
some time in juvenile facilities experienced fewer mental health problems when ultimately
transferred to adult placements. Id.
82. See, e.g., N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 7, 29
(finding based on data from 2001-02 that sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders
sentenced either to adult probation or adult prison had higher re-arrest rates than the
entire sample of youthful offenders ages thirteen to twenty-one). See generally N.C.
SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM EVALUATION:
OFFENDERS PLACED ON PROBATION OR RELEASED FROM PRISON IN FISCAL YEAR

2001/02 (Apr. 15,
2006),
available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/
Councils/spacfDocuments/ncspacrecid_2006.pdf (evaluating the effectiveness of the state's
correctional programs based upon data on the recidivism rates of youthful offenders);
N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, JUVENILE RECIDIVISM STUDY (May
1, 2007), available at http://www.nccourts.org/CourtslCRS/Councils/spacDocumentsl
ncspacjuvrecid_2007.pdf (analyzing for the first time in North Carolina an entire cohort of
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has been shown that while rehabilitation programs and intensive
treatment for adolescents can be expensive, they ultimately save
money by reducing the numbers of those who are prosecuted and
sentenced as repeat offenders.83
Such arguments have in many ways built upon assertions made
decades ago in North Carolina regarding the cost-effectiveness of
providing children with appropriate treatment and rehabilitative
services, rather than incarceration and other more punitive forms of
punishment. In 1919, for instance, child welfare advocates recognized
that providing preventative services to young offenders through the
juvenile court system would likely lower the crime rate.' 4 In 1947,
welfare officials recommended that young offenders receive
treatment in specialized boarding homes and detention centers rather
than adult jails, as they had found that this investment of time, effort,
and money was "more than repaid" by the improvement in the
behavior and attitudes of the children.85 Likewise, in 1957, the
governor asserted that including sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
within the original jurisdiction of juvenile court would "ultimately

delinquent juveniles statewide, regardless of offense type or disposition, and following
them through both the juvenile and adult criminal systems).
83. See Melissa S. Caulum, Post-Adolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect
Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WiS. L. REV.
729, 757 (2007); Leslie Kaufman, A Home Remedy for Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2008, at B1 (finding that in-home intensive therapy programs cost a fraction of the
annual expense of keeping a child in secure detention, a financial incentive that has led
New York State to close six residential juvenile facilities). Arguments premised on cost
savings have particular resonance in North Carolina, as the surging adult prison
population will require the state to spend tens of millions of dollars for construction of
new prisons during the next decade. See Dan Kane, Rising Inmate Population Puts State in
a Bind: Build Prisons or Reduce Sentences?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 18,
2008, at 10A (reporting on the enormous cost of expanding the state's prison system and
the move to find alternatives to expansion, such as community correction programs); see
also Editorial, Prison Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A16 (arguing that public
officials must adopt a "more rational, cost-effective approach" to prison policy in an age
when crime rates have fallen but incarceration rates have continued to rise); Adam Liptak,
Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at Al (reporting
that the United States leads the world in the numbers of those incarcerated and in the
length of prison sentences).
84. See N.C. STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES & PUBLIC WELFARE, THE JUVENILE
COURT LAW OF NORTH CAROLINA, at vi (1919) ("The children's court marks the greatest
advance in judicial procedure in this century. It has helped reveal to us the need of
organizing those preventive agencies spoken of above which may forestall even the action
of the court by decreasing the number of offenses.").
85. See Laurence Aydlett, Jailingof N.C. Children Showing Steady Decline, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 21, 1947, at 10.
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provide great savings in money and human resources. 8 6 Such
sentiments were expressed again in 1967 when it was found that
rehabilitating young offenders by providing meaningful academic
services and vocational education in open, closely-supervised training
schools lowered recidivism rates more effectively than methods
that
"punish, ignore, isolate, or try to fit the children into a pattern., 87
C. Brain Development and Adolescent Psychology
In recent years, advocates for extending jurisdiction to the age of
eighteen in North Carolina have increasingly relied upon research in
the neurological, behavioral, and social sciences.88 In particular,
technological advances and statistical findings from the field of
neuroscience have provided reformers with a more convincing
platform than in past decades, when they grounded their arguments
for raising the age either on common sense or well-meaning, but
scientifically unfounded, assumptions.89 To support the argument
that it takes far longer for teenage brains to fully develop than was
previously thought, policy briefs now contain diagrams of the lobes of
the cerebrum with detailed summaries of the processes of adolescent
brain development and functioning.9" They include multiple citations
to studies in the areas of developmental medicine and child
neurobiology that rely upon such technological advances as structural
magnetic resonance imaging and dynamic mapping of human cortical
development. 9' In a society evermore dependent upon science and

86. Press Release, The Office of the Governor of North Carolina (Feb. 13, 1957) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
87. Luelle Clark, RehabilitationAides Juveniles, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),

Feb. 19, 1967, at 6; see also STEVENS H. CLARKE, MECKLENBURG CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PILOT PROJECT, THE CONTRIBUTION OF JUVENILE OFFENDER TREATMENT AND
SERVICE PROGRAMS TO THE REDUCTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 25-28 (Oct. 19,

1973) (arguing that it is cost-effective to concentrate juvenile justice resources on serious
and "dangerous" offenders).
88. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 53, at 3-7

(calling for North Carolina to reevaluate state law and to add sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds to the current juvenile system in light of the latest scientific research on adolescent
brain development); see also infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing
advocacy in the 1950s for raising the age that relied upon assertions about the
physiological and psychological differences between adolescents and adults).
90. See, e.g., ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 53, at 3-7

(discussing the structural and functional changes that occur in the adolescent brain).
91. See, e.g., id. at 11-12.
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technology, advocates' increasing emphasis on hard science has
earned them some support. 92
A related argument for raising the age is based on the cognitive
and psychosocial differences between children and adults. Much has
been written in both the academic and popular press on this topic,
particularly as it relates to the treatment of adolescents in the criminal
justice system,93 and courts have premised critical decisionsincluding the abolition of the juvenile death penalty-upon research
that has exemplified these differences.9 4 In fact, a recent American

Bar Association report recommended on this basis that youthful
offenders receive less punitive sentences than adults convicted of the
same offenses.95 Further, commentators have asserted that North

Carolina's juvenile justice system is ideally suited to process cases
involving sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, as it already
provides developmentally appropriate screening, assessment,
92. See, e.g., Lisa Boone-Wood, Advocates Urge Action on State Law: Teens Should
Not Face Adult Court, They Say, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 28, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www2.journalnow.com/content/2008/feb/28/advocates-urge-action-on-state-law/
(reporting that brain research indicates that teenagers lack the ability to make sound
decisions and have difficulty with impulse-control); Editorial, Justice for Juveniles, THE
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Dec. 9, 2007, at 2F (relying on adolescent brain research to
argue for keeping young offenders up to age eighteen under the original jurisdiction of the
juvenile court); see also ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, CHILD POVERTY IN
A PREVENTABLE EPIDEMIC 3-4 (2008), available at
NORTH CAROLINA:
http://www.ncchild.org/action/images/stories/Poverty-Brieffinal.pdf (relying on research
in neuroscience to argue that poverty and deprivation affects brain development); Paul
Krugman, Op-Ed, Poverty is Poison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at A15 (arguing that
governments should commit themselves to reducing poverty, as neuroscientific research
has shown that children who grow up in very poor families with low socioeconomic status
have impaired neural development that undermines language development and memory).
93. See, e.g., Lisa J. Berlin & Courtnye Lloyd, Research on Adolescent Development,
Competence, and Character,in ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS AND THE LINE BETWEEN THE
13-16 (2007), available at
SYSTEMS
JUSTICE
CRIMINAL
AND
JUVENILE
http://www.familyimpactseminars.org/s-ncfis03report.pdf (discussing research on youth
development as it relates to issues of blameworthiness, competence to stand trial, and the
potential for an adolescent's character to change); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003)
(drawing on research and theory about adolescent development to argue that the
developmental immaturity of juveniles mitigates their criminal culpability and, thus, calls
for less severe punishment); Editorial, Young, Tough, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Dec. 13, 2006, at A16 (arguing for raising the jurisdiction age in juvenile court to
eighteen based on behavioral differences between adolescents and adults).
94. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (holding that in light of new
evidence regarding adolescent psychosocial and brain development, the imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were younger than eighteen when their crimes were
committed violates the Eighth Amendment).
95. See SALTZBURG, supra note 9, at 5.
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treatment, and rehabilitation for juveniles.96
North Carolina's
juvenile court system also has jurisdiction over the parents and
guardians of offenders, enabling the court to order that these adults
assist the juvenile in meeting the requirements of disposition and
participate in such programming as family counseling and parenting
skills training; unlike the adult system, if the youth's parent fails to
comply, the juvenile court has the power to impose sanctions.9 7 The
next Part demonstrates that opposition to raising the age has been
steadfast, with vocal opposition from police and prosecutors.
II. WHY MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO?

Opponents of raising the age have repeatedly marshaled
arguments for the status quo. While no single argument on its own
would likely have prevented the expansion of juvenile jurisdiction,
together they have continued to resonate with enough politicians and
legislators to carry the day. For this reason, among others, it is useful
to examine and consider them carefully.
A.

Lack of Fundingand Public Support

Since the establishment of North Carolina's first juvenile courts
in 1919, lawmakers and court personnel opposed to raising the age
have contended that the public does not support a comprehensive
system to address the needs of children charged with criminal
offenses or alleged to be abused or neglected. 98 In fact, the 1919
ratifying legislation was specifically crafted "for practical political
reasons" so that a juvenile court system could be established without
expending additional public funds and thereby engendering public
disapproval.99 From 1919 to the 1930s, reactions to the growth of the
juvenile court system ranged from hostility to indifference on the part
of judges and county-level officials, resulting in what one
contemporary scholar termed the "neglect [of juvenile court work] in
many of the counties of the state." '
It is, therefore, not surprising
that a governor's commission expressed a similar sentiment in 1998
96. See, e.g., ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 53, at 7.
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2700 to -2706 (2007) (stating that, the juvenile court
has authority over parents, guardians, and custodians of juveniles, that it may order them
to comply with orders of the court, and that it may hold them in civil or criminal contempt
for failure to comply with such orders).
98. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
99. MASON P. THOMAS, JR., REPORT OF TRAINING AND CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1 (1965).
100. WILEY BRITTON SANDERS, NEGRO CHILD WELFARE IN NORTH CAROLINA 185

(1933).

1466

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

when it concluded that the jurisdictional age should not be extended
because, among other factors, public opinion would not favor it.1 'O
Without a vocal constituency clamoring for a comprehensive,
well-funded system, lawmakers have consistently deemed the issue
not politically viable, resulting in chronic under-funding from the
state. 10 2 At most, politicians have readily acknowledged the woefully
underfunded state of the system while offering empty assurances that
improvements can be made without incurring significant cost. 03
Further compounding the matter, few legislators have taken up the
issue in public discourse, and fewer still have used the bully pulpit to
urge their constituents to support increased funding for juveniles at
risk.'
Another common refrain from those opposed to raising the
jurisdictional age has been that North Carolina should not take steps
to expand a broken system."5 Those opposed to extending the age on
this basis have most often been individuals or representatives of child
101. See GOVERNOR'S
(Mar. 10, 1998).

COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 4

102. See, e.g., ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 122 (stating that while the public
wanted more punitive measures to be taken against juvenile offenders, there was "an
unwillingness to either increase tax revenues or reorder spending priorities" to pay for
them); Steve Riley, Money Still Scarce for Juvenile Offenders, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), June 15, 1993, at 1A (reporting that the General Assembly refused to
budget the funds requested for treatment and services for children in delinquency court).
103. See, e.g., Jim Chaney, Juvenile Probers Urge Assembly to Set Up 'Youth Service
Board,' NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 10, 1955, at 1 (reporting that members
of a governor's commission on juvenile delinquency characterized facilities in the current
system as "pitifully inadequate," while also asserting that the cost of a new Youth Service
Board would "not be as great as the present cost" of committing delinquent children to
training schools).
104. A fairly exhaustive review of North Carolina's newspapers as well as legislative
documents and academic scholarship on the state's juvenile justice system since the early
1900s reveals the infrequency with which lawmakers have urged the public to support
increased funding for the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Chaney, supra note 103, at 1
(reporting that the governor's commission in 1955 exhorted the public to support the
establishment of a Youth Service Board because "[o]ur children, delinquent or not, are
worth the effort and the money required to help them grow into useful and worthwhile
citizens"); Kerry Gruson, Juvenile Justice System for State is Delinquent, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 2, 1969, at 1 (reporting that Gov. Bob Scott promised a
"comprehensive review" of services for delinquent youth and stated, "I am being kind
when I say the juvenile justice system in North Carolina is fragmented"); Press Release,
The Office of the Governor of North Carolina, supra note 86, at 1 (announcing that in
1957 Gov. Hodges asserted that raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction would
"ultimately provide great savings in money and human resources").
105. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note
101, at 4 ("The majority of the Juvenile Code Advisory Committee members felt that
raising the original jurisdictional age for delinquency would have a detrimental impact on
an already overburdened juvenile justice system.").
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welfare organizations who are involved in the juvenile justice
bureaucracy in some capacity and are unconvinced-or unwilling to
accept-that expansion can succeed. 10 6 For instance, in response to a
1959 proposal to raise the age, opponents made much of the shortstaffed and overloaded condition of juvenile training schools, and the
widespread reluctance to place a "bigger burden" on the courts than
they could handle."° Similarly, in 1969 opponents emphasized the
likelihood of a huge influx of juvenile court cases, the feeling that "we
need to do a better job for children under sixteen years of age before
the age jurisdiction is enlarged," and concern over the impact on the

state's juvenile prisons10 8 (also called "training schools" or "youth
development centers").
Even though most legislative proposals to raise the jurisdictional
age have specifically excluded the types of cases that could
overburden the courts or exacerbate overcrowding in training
schools,'0 9 concerns regarding the chronically substandard state of

106. Id. Economists might surmise that it was not in the self-interest of those in the
system to support an expansion that could have brought increased workloads with no
increase in salary. See Erika Gebo et al., Juvenile Justice Reform and the Courtroom
Workgroup: Issues of Perceptionand Workload, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 425, 431 (2006) (finding
that juvenile court employees who believed that reform efforts would lead to an increased
workload found ways to subvert or manipulate the effort in order to maintain the status
quo).
107. See Jack Crosswell, Juvenile Age Proposal Headed for Assembly, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 1, 1959, at 3 (stating the bases for opposition to a 1959
proposal by the State Congress of Parents and Teachers to extend the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction).
108. N.C. CTS. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE CTS. COMM'N, G.A. 1967, at 18 (1969).
Juvenile prisons in North Carolina, also known as "training schools" or "youth
development centers," are secure residential facilities to which delinquent juveniles, under
certain specified circumstances, may be committed by the juvenile court for an indefinite
term of at least six months. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(29) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2508(e) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2513(a) (2007).
109. See, e.g., H.B. 492, Gen. Assemb., 2007-08 Sess. (N.C. 2007) (proposing that
juvenile court jurisdiction be extended to age eighteen, except when sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds are charged with traffic offenses); THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE
ASS'N, A SYSTEM OF FAMILY COURTS FOR NORTH CAROLINA 78-79 (1957) (proposing
that the age of juvenile court jurisdiction be raised to eighteen, while allowing for sixteenand seventeen-year-old offenders charged with felonies to be transferred to adult court);
infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (discussing H.B. 396 that proposed extending
juvenile court jurisdiction to sixteen-year-old first offenders charged with misdemeanors
other than motor vehicle offenses); infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text (discussing
the proposal to extend the age of jurisdiction to eighteen, advanced in the 1960s, that left
the decision of whether sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds should be prosecuted as juveniles
or adults within the discretion of the prosecutor or judge).
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juvenile courts and correctional facilities are nonetheless legitimate." 0
A 1965 training and curriculum report for juvenile court judges, for
example, found that the juvenile court system had continued in North
Carolina counties "without change" during the previous forty-six
years, that the clerks who served as judges varied widely in their
"qualifications ...and in their attitudes," and that juvenile court was

at most a "minor or incidental" part of the clerks' responsibilities.'
The report characterized the juvenile court system as "a weak one"
and asserted that the "inadequacies" of the system had been long
evident to leaders in the child welfare field and to the juvenile court
judges themselves." 2 Scholars and the popular press have also
written extensively on the failings of the state's training schools." 3
B.

Objections of Police and Prosecutors

An additional set of objections to extending the age of
jurisdiction comes from law enforcement and prosecutors. 1 4 The
views of law enforcement on the topic have changed little during the
past several decades. The principal bases of their objections are that

"coddling" juvenile offenders will increase, rather than decrease,

110. See infra note 113 and supra note 75 and accompanying text (referencing studies
and reports that have chronicled the substandard nature of the state's juvenile courts and
training schools).
111. THOMAS, supra note 99, at 1; see also Steve Riley, Quality of Juvenile Justice
Fluctuates with Geography, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 21, 1993, at 13A
(reporting on inequities in the availability of services for delinquent children in different
counties across the state).
112. THOMAS, supra note 99, at 2.
113. See, e.g., N.C. BAR ASS'N PENAL SYS. STUDY CoMM., AS THE TWIG IS BENT 3
(1972) (asserting that North Carolina has more children committed to training schools per
capita than any other state, and characterizing its training schools as "a 'dumping ground'
for the mentally retarded, the uneducable, the run-aways, pregnant girls, the neglected
and, in many instances, simply the unwanted child"); Steve Riley, Training Schools or
Prisons?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 19, 1993, at 1A (reporting on the
deficiencies of North Carolina's training schools and on their failure to rehabilitate);
David Hough, The Unconstitutionality of the North Carolina Reformatories 6-14 (1970)
(unpublished paper, Duke Center on Law & Poverty) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (concluding, in the context of a discussion of a 1969 North Carolina law that
allows for commitments to training school for indefinite terms, that the reformatory
commitment "constitutes a dreary, hateful experience that does more harm than good");
see also supra note 75 (acknowledging that there are serious systemic problems with
juvenile prisons across the United States).
114. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns of these
groups regarding proposals to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction); see also David
Ingram, Treat 16-, 17-year-olds as Juveniles, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 6,
2007, at 5B (reporting that opposition to a 2007 bill to raise the jurisdictional age "came
from district attorneys, sheriffs and the juvenile justice system itself, which is undergoing a
major overhaul").
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crime; that offenses by juveniles are "as much against society" as
similar crimes by adults; and that the cost of investigating a crime is

the same whether the suspect is a juvenile or an adult." 5 While the
language used to express these sentiments has varied over the years,
1 16
the underlying views have not.
Prosecuting attorneys have emphasized that extending juvenile

court due process protections to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
criminal suspects would place unnecessary investigative burdens upon
the state." 7 Specifically, they have noted that while adult suspects

may give consent for non-testimonial identification procedures such
as photographs or fingerprints, the prosecution would need to delay
the investigation and obtain a court order for such procedures if the

sixteen- or seventeen-year-old suspect were a juvenile."'

They have

also argued that investigations of crimes with sixteen- and seventeen-

year-old suspects would likely suffer because juveniles may not be
detained for as long as adults without judicial review." 9 Others have
115. See Crosswell, supra note 107, at 3 (reporting the grounds upon which police
officials opposed raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in 1959); see also Blythe,
supra note 77 (suggesting that law enforcement opposed raising the age in 2007 because of
worries that sending violent teens through the juvenile system would amount to "little
more than a slap on the wrist").
116. Assuming that their stated reasons for opposition are genuine, one response
would be to emphasize the benefits of including at least a segment of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders under the original jurisdiction of juvenile court; such a shift
would decrease recidivism rates, provide a cost-savings to the state, and bring North
Carolina into the mainstream in terms of national juvenile justice policy. See supra notes
73-87 and accompanying text.
117.

THE JUVENILE

LAW STUDY

COMM'N,

REPORT TO

THE

1987

GENERAL

ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, G.A. 1987, at E-23 (1987) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
118. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-271 (2007) (stating that a non-testimonial
identification order for an adult may be issued by any judge upon request by a
prosecutor). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2103 (2007) (stating that non-testimonial
identification procedures shall not be conducted on any juvenile without a court order
unless the juvenile has been charged as an adult or transferred to superior court for trial as
an adult), with State v. Watson, 294 N.C. 159, 240 S.E.2d. 440 (1978) (holding that a court
order is unnecessary when an adult defendant voluntarily participates in the pretrial
confrontation).
119. THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N 1987, supra note 117, at E-23; see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-1901 (a), (b) (2007) (stating that when a juvenile is taken into temporary
custody without a court order, the juvenile's parent or guardian must be notified and the
juvenile shall not be held for more than twelve hours unless a court order has been
entered); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1906(a), (b) (2007) (stating that, after a secure custody
order has been entered, a juvenile has a right either to a hearing on the merits within five
calendar days or further hearings to determine the need for continued secure custody at
intervals of no more than ten calendar days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-505 (2007) (stating
that law enforcement has a duty to notify a minor's parent or guardian after a minor is
charged with a criminal offense). But see In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154,158,174 S.E.2d
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maintained that the state's resources should be invested in the
treatment and rehabilitation of pre-adolescents and younger teens
because sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds

are less capable of

fundamental change in character, morals, and behavior than the
and their assistants continue to
younger cohort.' District attorneys
12 1
express similar sentiments today.
In addition, according to the legislative history, crime victims and
their advocates have infrequently weighed in on proposals to include

sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders within the jurisdiction of
juvenile court in North Carolina. In recent years, however, some
opponents to raising the age have suggested that victims would be

dissatisfied with the more rehabilitative and less punitive approach of
the juvenile court system, and that they would not be "made whole"

through restitution or other remedies that are more readily obtained
from adult, rather than juvenile, offenders. 22 Given the commitment
of juvenile court to individualized treatment and disposition,
however, legislation could be drafted to ensure that victims' views are
given weight at critical stages of the adjudicatory process. 123 Since
281, 283 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971) (holding that there is no right to bond in
North Carolina's juvenile court system and no right to a jury trial).
120. THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N, supra note 117, at E-24. But see supra
notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing research in psychology and neurology
supporting the view that offenders younger than eighteen should not be considered as
culpable or criminally responsible as adults because they are not fully formed).
121. See, e.g., Dan Kane, An Adult at 16? Courts Say Yes, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 8, 2006, at 1B (reporting that in 2006 the former president of the N.C.
Conference of District Attorneys opposed raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction,
stating that there were "less dramatic measures that lawmakers should consider");
Michelle Moriarity et al., They Said It, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 2007,
at 26A (quoting the president-elect of the N.C. Conference of District Attorneys in his
opposition to raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in 2007). But see Shay Bilchik,
Op-Ed., 'Adult' Trials Fail Teenagers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 21, 2007,
at 11A (op-ed by former prosecutor and U.S. Justice Department official in favor of 2007
legislation to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction).
122. See Blythe, supra note 77 (quoting the general counsel of the N.C. Sheriffs'
Association as opposing raising the jurisdictional age in 2007 based on the fact that
"[t]here's been little study of the victims in all this," and quoting the Wake County Sheriff
as urging legislators not to "forget the victims"); Moriarity et al., supra note 121 (quoting a
state representative in 2007 as opposing raising the age because "crime victims will get
relief much later").
123. For instance, the preferences of the victim could be made an explicit factor in the
calculus when the prosecutor, and then the judge, determines whether the sixteen- or
seventeen-year-old offender's case should be transferred to adult court. North Carolina's
current transfer laws allow for the prosecutor to offer evidence at the transfer hearing,
which conceivably could include testimony by the victim. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B2203(a) (2007) ("At the transfer hearing, the prosecutor and the juvenile may be heard
and may offer evidence, and the juvenile's attorney may examine any court or probation
records, or other records the court may consider in determining whether to transfer the
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little has been done in the past to address or satisfy the concerns of
victims and their advocates, there is clearly room for compromise in
this area-as well as in the aforementioned areas of concern to law

enforcement and prosecutors. The next Part documents that, despite
the backing of prominent scholars and child welfare experts, wellconsidered proposals to raise the age have been repeatedly defeated
based in large part on the arguments just examined.
III. A LONG-ESTABLISHED PATTERN: 1915 TO 2008

The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 was the first document
to differentiate between adults and children in the state's courts and
institutions.12 4 It allowed for the establishment of "Houses of
Refuge" for juveniles, the original model for today's training
schools, 125 and called for the appointment of a Board of Public
Charities, which would provide for "the poor, the unfortunate and
case."); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2007) (allowing transfer upon motion of the
prosecutor, the juvenile's attorney, or upon the court's own motion); supra notes 47-51
and infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (discussing the current laws regarding
transfer from juvenile to adult court in North Carolina and the criteria to be considered by
the court when determining whether to transfer jurisdiction). Similarly, the victim's losses,
be they monetary, physical, or psychological, could be considered when determining if
transfer to superior court were appropriate. North Carolina's transfer laws could be
amended to explicitly include the loss of the victim as a factor to be considered in the
transfer decision, although the statute does currently provide for consideration of the
serious or violent nature of the offense. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203(7), (8) (2007)
(requiring the court in a transfer hearing to consider whether the alleged offense was
committed in an "aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner," as well as the
"seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the public requires that the
juvenile be prosecuted as an adult"). Likewise, in cases remaining in juvenile court-such
as those involving misdemeanors or felonies that do not involve serious injury to persons
or property-the victim's preferences and losses could be taken into account when the
juvenile court judge determines the conditions of probation at disposition. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2506(4), (22) (2007) (requiring that the juvenile pay restitution to "any
person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the
juvenile," and allowing the court to "determine the amount, terms, and conditions" of the
restitution). But see Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical
Criticismsof the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 438-39 (2004)
(arguing against schemes that allow victims to be portrayed as blameless, as they allow
wrongdoers to be framed as entirely morally culpable). See generally Lynne N.
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938 (1985) (examining
"the impact that current victim's rights proposals and programs will likely have both on
the criminal process and on victims").
124. See Thomas, Juvenile Justice, supra note 41, at 2; see also JOHN V. ORTH, THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 12-20 (1995) (discussing the history of the

North Carolina Constitution of 1868).
125. N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1868) ("A House or Houses of Refuge may be
established whenever the public interest may require it, for the correction and instruction
of other classes of offenders.").
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126

The Constitution of 1868 also gave the Governor
executive power and wide discretion to pardon those convicted of "all
offenses,"' 127 a power that he used to remove young offenders from
adult prisons before the establishment of the state's first training
[the] orphan.,

school.'28

Until a statewide juvenile court system was established in 1919,
children aged seven through fifteen were adjudicated in adult
criminal courts under the "common law of crimes applicable to
children."12 9 These consisted of three general rules that defined the

126. N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (1868) ("Beneficent provision for the poor, the
unfortunate and orphan, being one of the first duties of a civilized and a Christian State,
the General Assembly shall, at its first session, appoint and define the duties of a Board of
Public Charities, to whom shall be intrusted [sic] the supervision of all charitable and
penal State institutions, and who shall annually report to the Governor upon their
condition, with suggestions for their improvement."); N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (1868)
("There shall also, as soon as practicable, be measures devised by the State for the
establishment of one or more Orphan Houses, where destitute orphans may be cared for,
educated and taught some business or trade.").
127. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 6 (1868) ("The Governor shall have power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses (except in cases of
impeachment) upon such conditions as he may think proper, subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons.").
128. See Thomas, Juvenile Justice, supra note 41, at 3-4 & n.17 (stating, based on
Legislative and Public Documents for the years 1869-1909, that more than 150 children
and youthful offenders were pardoned during these years to remove them from adult
prisons, as such punishments were considered "unjust, cruel, monstrous and absurd").
The establishment of the Stonewall Jackson Manual Training and Industrial School, which
opened in January 1909, was the result of a seventeen-year campaign by the Board of
Charities and Public Welfare and others to ensure that the state had a correctional facility
for boys. The school was intended for white boys, aged sixteen and younger, in need of
"correction, education, and training in middle class values." ALLEY & WILSON, supra
note 30, at 3. In 1918, the State Home and Industrial School for Girls (Samarkand Manor)
opened for white girls, and, in 1925, a training school was opened for African-American
boys as well as one for African-American girls. Id. at 3-4, 6-7. The first coeducational
and racially-integrated training school in North Carolina was not established until 1961.
Id. at 35; see also SANDERS, supra note 100, at 193-214, 263 (analyzing the delinquency
cases of African American children in North Carolina between 1919 and 1929, and
concluding that African American children received more punitive treatment than their
white counterparts). Despite the establishment of multiple training schools, children
younger than ten years old were still being confined to adult jails in 1937. See Child
Prisoners Cause Criticism, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 23, 1938, at 3
(reporting that sixty-six of the 1,070 children illegally held in adult jails during 1937 were
younger than ten years old). It was not until 1947 that the numbers of children illegally
detained in adult jails showed a steady decline. See Aydlett, supra note 85, at 10.
However, it was reported in 1963 that delinquent children were still "frequently" placed in
jails with adult offenders in violation of North Carolina law. Mason P. Thomas, Jr.,
Juvenile CourtJudges Discuss Youth Problems,POPULAR GOV'T, June-July 1963, at 7, 26.
129. State v. Yeargan, 117 N.C. 706, 707, 23 S.E. 153, 154 (1895) (holding that, for
children between the ages of seven and fourteen, there is a rebuttable presumption that
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concepts of criminal responsibility and criminal intent for young

offenders, depending on their age and capacity: 3° 1) children under
seven were conclusively presumed to be incapable of criminal intent
and, thus, could not be prosecuted or punished for any crime; 2)
children between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed
incapable of crime, but such presumption could be rebutted by
evidence that the child was "capable of discerning between good and
13
evil"; and 3) children over fourteen were treated as adult offenders. 1
In general, children in the middle cohort-aged seven to fourteen-

were prosecuted for felonies but not misdemeanors, unless there were

132
aggravating factors such as serious injury or use of a weapon.
It is against this backdrop-marked by public recognition that,

because of their lack of maturity, children should be adjudged
differently than adults-that the Probation Courts Act of 1915 was
passed, the first piece of legislation to authorize that offenders
younger than eighteen were to be adjudicated for crimes in a separate
system from adults. 133 While the Probation Courts Act served as a

positive, progressive model for subsequent legislation affecting North
Carolina's juvenile court system, its directive that juvenile court
jurisdiction extend to age eighteen was rejected just four years later
and never again passed into law.' This early pattern of reform and
retrenchment has continued to the present day.

they lack criminal intent and are thus incapable of committing crimes); see also Thomas,
Juvenile Justice,supra note 41, at 2.
130. See Yeargan, 117 N.C. at 707, 23 S.E. at 154; see also Thomas, Juvenile Justice,
supra note 41, at 3.
131. Yeargan, 117 N.C. at 707, 23 S.E. at 154.
132. Id. at 708, 23 S.E. at 154; see also State v. Pugh, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 61, 62-63 (1859)
("The wisdom of the common law is illustrated in the rule, that for an ordinary [nonaggravating] assault and battery, a boy under the age of 14, is not liable to indictment; in
the nature of things.. it is better to leave such matters to the correction which the parent
or school-master may, in their discretion inflict than give importance to it by bringing
'Young America' into court like a man, with all the pomp and circumstance of a trial by
the court and jury which is to result in a fine, to be paid out of the pocket of 'papa'!").
133. See Thomas, Juvenile Justice,supra note 41, at 5.
134. See Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 222 § 2, 1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 294 ("Any child eighteen
years of age, or under, may be arrested, but without imprisonment with hardened
criminals and brought before any of these courts to be tried and dealt with as hereinafter
prescribed."); Mabel Brown Ellis, Dependency and Delinquency, in CHILD WELFARE IN
NORTH CAROLINA 9, 22-28 (1918) (stating that, despite its defects, the Probation Courts
Act succeeded in introducing the idea of probation to the North Carolina courts, and that
it set the jurisdictional age at eighteen, which was the "highest limit yet established by
similar legislation in any part of the country"); infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the 1919 reduction of the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction from eighteen
to sixteen).
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The Juvenile Court System Meets Early Opposition

While many child advocates
Probation Courts Act of 1915 to
gave judges unlimited discretion
children to adult criminal court,135

concepts

that transformed

and policymakers considered the
be broadly ineffectual because it
to transfer whole categories of
the law did introduce several new

the state's

treatment

of juvenile

offenders. 13 6 In addition to recommending that the jurisdictional age

be extended to eighteen, the Act initiated the practice of placing an
offender on probation after conviction for a crime, rather than
imprisoning him or imposing another type of punishment. 3 7

As

North Carolina had no probation law at this time for adults, the
proposal that such a system be implemented for juveniles was
groundbreaking. 3 8 The Act also introduced the concept of providing

separate forums for juveniles and adults, including trying juveniles
apart from adults and keeping separate court dockets and records as
well as detaining and imprisoning juveniles in facilities that were
segregated from those of adults.139
135. See Act of Mar. 9,1915, ch. 222 § 2, 1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 294 ("When a child has
been known to be a repeated offender against the law, incorrigible, and whose freedom in
society is thought by the judge adjudicating his case to be a menace to society, may be
disposed of according to the discretion of the court."); see also Ellis, supra note 134, at 28
(stating that this group of children-those who are continually in trouble and have
repeated court appearances-are the group above all others who are most in need of
probationary services, and that the judge's discretion to transfer them from the juvenile
system to the adult system should be limited).
136. See Ellis, supra note 134, at 28 (noting the "three forward steps of importance"
that were effectuated by the Probation Courts Act).
137. Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 222 § 2, 1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 294, 294-95 ("It shall be the
duty of the court ... to suspend sentence when the child is found guilty and place him on
probation for a specified period, three, six or twelve months, or longer, as the court may
think best; and shall require both the probation officer having the moral control of such
child remaining under the jurisdiction of the court to appear with the child in question
from time to time and at the termination of the probation period fixed by the court, and
report as to his progress and general condition. The court may dismiss the case, if
satisfied, or place the child again on probation, or commit him to some suitable county or
State training school, or a proper private home .... "); see also Ellis, supra note 134, at 28.
138. Ellis, supra note 134, at 22.
139. Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 222 § 4 ("It shall be the duty of the court ... to hold as far
as practicable separate trials for the children, and if possible in a private office removed
from all criminal features and surroundings, and also to keep and have kept what shall be
known as the Juvenile Record .... "), § 5 ("No court or justice of the peace, or sheriff or
arresting officer shall commit to prison and incarcerate any child fourteen years of age,
and under, in any jail or prison enclosure where the child will be the companion of older
and more hardened criminals, except where the charge is for a capital or other felony, or
where the child is a known incorrigible or habitual offender. The court... may place such
child in some suitable place or detention home, or in the temporary custody of any
responsible person who will give bail or become responsible for his appearance at court."),
1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 294, 295; Ellis, supra note 134, at 28.
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The overriding weakness of the Probation Courts Act, however,
was its failure to fund its plan for a statewide system of juvenile
courts."4
While the Act directed that juvenile courts appoint
probation officers, it allowed them to work on a voluntary or salaried
basis, and it permitted county commissioners to pay them whatever
amount was considered "advisable and just." 4' The result, not
surprisingly, was that the law was not uniformly applied across the
state; by 1919, only ten North Carolina cities had complied, with just
one employing a probation officer who worked full-time in juvenile
court or who had any previous training.'
In 1919, the Probation Courts Act was repealed by the
legislature, and the Juvenile Court Statute was passed, representing
the state's first meaningful attempt to establish a statewide system of
juvenile courts.'4 3 While an early draft of the 1919 statute called for
juvenile court jurisdiction to extend to all children under age
eighteen, the legislation that was ultimately adopted covered only

140. Ellis, supra note 134, at 11 ("North Carolina has no juvenile court law, for the
Probation Courts Act, passed in 1915, accomplished little more than a partial introduction
to the principles of probation. It in no sense established a real juvenile court.");
SANDERS, supra note 100, at 183 ("[T]he act was so loosely drawn, and was so indefinite in
its provisions, that outside of a few of the cities... it had little effect."). See also supra notes
98-104 and accompanying text (discussing the state's chronic underfunding of the juvenile
court system).
141. Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 222 § 2 ("It shall be the duty of the court, after
consultation with proper persons, to appoint either some volunteer or paid probation
officer who shall have charge of the delinquent or dependent children brought before the
court."), § 3 ("[The court] shall suggest to the county commissioners that such probation
officer be paid whatever amount is deemed advisable and just by the court, especially
when no suitable volunteer probation officer can be secured, and the board of
commissioners of any county are hereby empowered in their discretion to make the
necessary appropriation to carry this section into effect."), 1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 294, 296;
ALLEY & WILSON, supranote 30, at 4; Thomas, Juvenile Justice, supra note 41, at 5 ("[The
Act] depended on boards of county commissioners to pay the probation staff but did not
require them to do so.").
142. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 4; Ellis, supra note 134, at 31.
143. See Act of Mar. 3, 1919, ch. 97 § 25, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 243, 254; ALLEY &
WILSON, supra note 30, at 4; SANDERS, supra note 100, at 183. The constitutionality of
the legislation was challenged-and upheld-soon after the law's passage. See State v.
Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 742, 102 S.E. 711, 714 (1920) (holding that the law, which denies
juveniles the right to a trial by jury, was within the police power of the state, as the
juvenile court placed the state in the role of guardian of its children); see also Ex parte
Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 356, 72 S.E. 1049, 1054-55 (1911) (holding that committing a child
to training school for a period of time exceeding that allowed for imprisonment of an adult
for the same offense is not unconstitutional, as detention of this nature is "for the training
and moral development of the criminally delinquent children of the State" and is not
punishment for a crime).
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those younger than sixteen.1" While no explicit grounds or rationale
for this change can be found in the legislative or social history of the
time, the lowering of the jurisdictional age may have reflected the
general reluctance of lawmakers to support a "special" court for
juveniles that operated outside the traditional adversary system.145
In the decades that followed the passage of the 1919 statute,
resistance to the concept and reality of a statewide system of juvenile
courts surfaced in the areas of government funding and judicial
support.
Because the legislature appropriated no state funds,
counties had to enlist local officials to serve as juvenile court judges
and probation officers and to provide services through the alreadyburdened county public welfare department. 146 Meanwhile, the
juvenile court system was handling a large number of cases; during
the years of 1929 through 1934, approximately 17,000 children were

processed in these courts. 147 The combination of lack of funding and
increasing caseloads led to limited supervision, treatment, and

residential placements for delinquent as well as dependent and
neglected children. 148 In fact, as of 1929, nearly one-third of the

state's counties contributed no monies to their local juvenile court

144. Act of Mar. 3, 1919, ch. 97 § 1, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 243; ALLEY & WILSON, supra
note 30, at 4; supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (noting that the age of juvenile
court jurisdiction was inexplicably lowered from eighteen to sixteen with the passage of
the Juvenile Court Statute of 1919).
145. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 5. There are few explanations for why
age sixteen, rather than another age, was chosen for the upper limit of juvenile court
jurisdiction in North Carolina. Given that during this time period more states set the
upper limit at sixteen than any other age but eighteen, and given that no state set the age
lower than sixteen, it is likely that North Carolina legislators were merely following
established pattern and practice.

See HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE

UNITED STATES 47 n.1 (1927) (finding that, as of 1925, one state set the limit at nineteen;
fourteen states set it at eighteen; four set it at seventeen; and thirteen (presumably
including North Carolina) set the limit at sixteen, with several outliers setting it at twenty
or twenty-one).
146. Act of Mar. 3, 1919, ch. 97 § 11, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 243, 248 ("The judge
appointing any probation officer may in his discretion determine that a suitable salary be
paid and may, with the approval of the judge of the Superior Court, fix the amount
thereof. Such salary so determined and so approved shall be paid by the board of county
commissioner[s]."), 252 (discussing compensation for judges); ALLEY & WILSON, supra
note 30, at 4-5.
147. WILEY B. SANDERS & WILLIAM C. EZELL, JUVENILE COURT CASES IN NORTH

CAROLINA 1929-1934, at 7-8 (1937).
148. ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 5; see also N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES &
PUB. WELFARE, JUVENILE COURTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 10 (1923) ("Wherever the
[juvenile court] system is failing to work with reasonable success, it is due to the

inefficiency of officials or a lack of proper facilities for handling difficult cases.").
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and approximately one-third
of the state's counties paid no salary to
149
their juvenile court judge.
In addition to the tangible problems that arose from lack of
funding, the growth and development of the juvenile court system

was also stymied by judges' unfamiliarity with juvenile court's
principles and procedures. 5 ° As juvenile judges presided with
virtually unfettered discretion, many had little or no regard for
traditional notions of due process, and the system became an acutely

informal one.' 5 ' These hurdles were further heightened by judges'
hostility to the juvenile court's emphasis on treatment and
rehabilitation rather than incarceration or other more punitive forms
of punishment.'52
B.

Strong Advocacy for Raising the Age

While supporters of North Carolina's incipient juvenile court
system acknowledged that there were problems with its functioning
and efficacy, statistics showed that for the period of 1929 through
1944, the total number of delinquency cases had in fact decreased,

suggesting that the system was beginning to have a positive impact149. See SANDERS, supra note 100, at 185.

150. Id.
151. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 5. The 1919 Juvenile Court Statute
provided for separate court hearings for juveniles and for exclusion of the "general public"
from juveniles' cases. See Act of Mar. 3, 1919, ch. 97 § 4, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws 243, 244
("In the hearing of any case coming within the provisions of this act the general public
may be excluded and only such persons admitted thereto as have a direct interest in the
case."); N.C. STATE BD. OF CHARITIES & PUB. WELFARE, supra note 148, at 5 ("The
curious spectators not concerned in the case should be excluded from the room where the
hearing is held."). While closed hearings for juveniles were believed to protect children
from the stigma of a public adjudication, in recent decades there has been a move toward
more openness in juvenile court proceedings, although "widespread ambivalence" still
exists over the extent to which such proceedings should be open. See JANET MASON,
CONFIDENTIALITY IN JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS 5 & n.3 (2004) (discussing the
issue of open hearings in North Carolina juvenile courts); see also William McHenry
Horne, Note, The Movement to Open Juvenile Courts: Realizing the Significance of Public
Discourse in First Amendment Analysis, 39 IND. L. REV. 659, 676-79 (2006) (describing
the trend toward opening juvenile proceedings to the public); Danielle R. Oddo, Note,
Removing Confidentiality Protections and the "Get Tough" Rhetoric: What Has Gone
Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 131-35 (1998)
(describing changes in laws affecting the confidentiality of delinquent proceedings and the
consequences of those changes). According to the current N.C. Juvenile Code, the
presumption is that all court hearings in delinquency cases are open to the public,
although the court may close a hearing for good cause at the juvenile's request. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402 (2007).
152. See SANDERS, supra note 100, at 185 ("[In some instances the judges were
actually hostile to the juvenile court movement, thinking it was merely a method of 'letting
the youthful criminal go free.' ").
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however modest-on the state's juvenile crime rate.153 Perhaps in
response, scholars, child welfare advocates, and legislators-either
directly or through the work of appointed commission membersbegan to advance arguments for raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction in North Carolina. 54 Many of the arguments were
particularly sophisticated, as they recognized that sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds have more in common with younger adolescents
than adults in terms of both social and brain development. 5 These
arguments were also notable for their characterization of North
Carolina as out of step with the majority of states through its failure
to include this group of "lost children" within the original jurisdiction
of juvenile court.'56
The work of Wiley Britton Sanders, a prominent child welfare
scholar in the 1940s, is a prime example of such advocacy.157 In the

context of a discussion of the cultural relativity of the meaning of
"juvenile delinquency," '5 8 Professor Sanders, who taught at the
School of Social Work at the University of North Carolina, contended

that a child's age must be considered when attempting to determine
"the degree of his responsibility for his behavior."'5 9 He surveyed the

upper age limit of jurisdiction in juvenile courts across the United
States and noted that the disparity meant that "a child can continue to
be a juvenile delinquent from one to five years longer in some states
1 60
than he can in others.

Id. at 4.
See infra notes 157-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
See SANDERS, supra note 7, at 4-10; see also Paul W. Shankweiler, Book Review,
28 SOCIAL FORCES 98 (1949) (reviewing WILEY BRITTON SANDERS, JUVENILE COURTS
IN NORTH CAROLINA (1948) and stating, "[t]o Professor Sanders' untiring devotion to
this pioneering task North Carolina and the South at large owe much.").
158. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 6 ("Still another concept which complicates the
situation is that children's behavior standards vary according to the culture of their
group."). Sanders noted, for instance, that while assaultive behavior among children is
unacceptable in the United States, certain "primitive tribes" encourage such conduct
because it "has a survival value in making the children brave to fight their enemies." Id.
(citations omitted). He also observed that cultural standards can vary from generation to
generation, as in the case of cigarette smoking, for which young college women could have
been expelled "[a] few years ago," while an institution "would be laughed at for taking
such a step today." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 6-7 (noting that in 1948, the upper age limit of juvenile court jurisdiction
was sixteen in four states; seventeen in three states; eighteen in twenty states; nineteen in
one state; and twenty-one in five states).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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Showing prescience in light of legal developments that occurred
in the decades to follow, Professor Sanders addressed a wide range of

issues regarding the philosophy and structure of juvenile delinquency
court. Because he believed that any discussion of the proper
jurisdiction of delinquency court would be incomplete if it were
limited to the chronological age of the child, he advocated for the
consideration of the "mental age" as well as the "emotional age and

[the] social age" of the child when evaluating whether a matter should
be handled in juvenile or adult court. 161 Professor Sanders also urged
that juvenile delinquency be considered "part of the learning
process," with greater emphasis on the role and responsibility of
parents.162 He called attention to the disparate treatment of children

161. Id. at 7. Sanders suggested that a child's "mental age" could be revealed by
"psychological tests of intelligence," and that a child's emotional and social age were
concepts that "hold rich promise for further exploration and research." Id. He placed
particular emphasis on states like North Carolina, with a jurisdictional age limit of sixteen,
as these would likely have many older adolescents whose mental, social, or emotional age
was fifteen or younger, potentially qualifying them for juvenile court jurisdiction under
such an analysis. Id.; see also Lou, supra note 145, at 49-52 (asserting that the age
jurisdiction of juvenile court should be viewed in the "light of [both] psychology and
psychiatry," and recognizing that a chronological age limit will necessarily "be more or less
arbitrary"); Thomas Grisso et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court, 10 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 9 (1987) (describing" 'normal' immaturity" as an important aspect of
juvenile competence); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 162-67 (2003) (arguing that "developmental negligence"
defenses should not only be based on a defendant's age but also on his maturity or mental
capacity). But see In re Wright, 137 N.C. App. 104,111,527 S.E.2d 70, 74 (2000) (holding
that the N.C. legislature intended for juveniles who have reached age thirteen to be
subject to transfer to superior court, and that the decision should be based on
chronological age only, not developmental, psychological, or emotional age).
162. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 7-9 (asserting that, because all children inevitably
make mistakes in the process of "acquiring culture," delinquency is a "relative matter"
that turns on the class and race of the child, for which parents and society must share
responsibility). Sanders stated that, because "people of wealth and social prominence
have more adequate private resources for correcting their children's behavior problems
than do the parents in the lower social and economic levels[,]" the "highly selective
influence of social status" is a "serious limitation ... in the use of juvenile court cases as a
yardstick for measuring juvenile delinquency." Id. at 8. For a contemporary expression of
related sentiments, see Franklin E. Zimring, PenalProportionalityfor the Young Offender:
Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271,
283-85 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing adolescence as a
period of "learning by doing" in which criminal offenses are "a more or less normal
adolescent phenomenon," and recommending that policies which do not compromise the
long-term interests of the youthful offender be utilized to reduce youth crime, rather than
purely punitive responses). Based on concepts of penal proportionality and theories of
youth as a protected status, Zimring argues that the immaturity and diminished
responsibility of youth should be mitigating factors when determining punishment until
the offender has reached his late teens. Id. at 277-83.
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in juvenile court based on race and socioeconomic status, 163 and he
expressed concern for the lack of due process rights for juveniles, an
issue that would not come to the national fore for another two
decades.'64
Given the depth of Professor Sanders' discussion and analysis of
the relevant issues confronting juvenile courts in North Carolina, his
ultimate recommendation that the jurisdictional age be raised from
sixteen to seventeen is notable for its relative modesty.1 65 It is not
unlikely that Sanders anticipated the strong resistance that would
greet a proposal to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction but a
single year. In fact, when a 1953 state commission addressed the
question of the appropriate upper age limit before the introduction of
166
a House bill on the subject, it favorably noted Sanders' scholarship
but ultimately rejected the proposed legislation.167
While the commission acknowledged that North Carolina's
upper age limit of sixteen was "considerably lower than the average
of other states,"' 68 it opposed an increase in the limit because judges
and correctional personnel maintained that North Carolina lacked the
facilities to detain and provide training for "the unruly percentage of
such an older age group. 1 69 Though the commission recognized that
163. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 8-9 (contending that the race of a child influences
whether that child will be brought before the juvenile court, as does whether the child lives
in an urban or rural area).
164. Id. at 7 ("If an adult cannot be classed as a criminal until he has been first tried on
a criminal charge and convicted by a jury of his peers in a court of competent jurisdiction,
then it would follow that no child should be classed as a juvenile delinquent until he has
been declared to be such by a judge of a juvenile court after an official hearing."). Sanders
objected to "unofficial" supervision by probation officers when a child has not been
formally found delinquent by a juvenile court after an "official" hearing. Id.; cf. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55, 57 (1967) (granting to juveniles in delinquency proceedings
the due process rights of counsel, notice of the charges, the privilege against selfincrimination, sworn testimony, and the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses).
165. SANDERS, supra note 7, at 198 ("[S]ince only three other states have the age
jurisdiction of the juvenile court as low as sixteen years for both boys and girls the age
limit in North Carolina should be extended until the child reaches the seventeenth
birthday.").
166. See COMM'N ON JUV. CTS. & CORR. INSTS., REPORT TO GOVERNOR LUTHER H.

HODGES AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA at 7 (1955) (citing

Sanders' Juvenile Court in North Carolina for "very aptly" pointing out that the crime of
placing juveniles in adult jails "oftentimes is more serious and destructive" than any
criminal act that the child may have committed); see also SANDERS, supranote 7, at 163.
167. See COMM'N ON JUV. CTS. & CORR. INSTS., supra note 166, at 5, 19-20.
168. See id. at 5.
169. Id. at 5-6. The 1953 Commission recommended that a request for appropriations
for a 'closed' training school, a locked facility from which juveniles could not readily leave,
be presented to the 1957 General Assembly. Id. at 17, 18-19; ALLEY & WILSON, supra
note 30, at 20 ("A separate closed or security type institution of correction and training
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the age limit should "in time" be increased, 170 it qualified its

endorsement by stating that an appropriate correctional institution
for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds must be established first.'
Because of the lack of unanimity among commission members with
regard to the age jurisdiction issue, specific recommendations were
not made, and the proposed bill was not studied.17

While the commission may have had reason to worry about
correctional facilities and funding, 73 it should not have refused even
to consider the proposed legislation. House Bill 396 would have

raised juvenile court jurisdiction to seventeen only for first offenders
charged with misdemeanors-necessitating no training schools, let
alone secure ones.17" Yet, given the unwillingness of the advisory
body to consider the bill, and the vocal opposition of clerks of court
and correctional personnel,'75 it is not surprising that lawmakers
76
rejected the legislation less than a month after it was introduced.
was recommended by the commission, with plans and the appropriations request to be
presented to the 1957 General Assembly.").
170. See COMM'N ON JUV. CrS. & CORR. INSTS., supra note 166, at 5.
171. See id. at 19-20 ("It is recommended that the juvenile court age be raised to
include children in their sixteenth and seventeenth years, by two steps, but only if it can be
done in such a manner as to preclude any child in this age group being committed to any
one of the institutions of correction and training until the closed institution of correction
and training has been established."); see also ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 19
("[H.B. 396] failed with the principal argument against it being that the training schools
were overcrowded and could not handle the increased number of children."); Letter from
Samuel E. Leonard, Comm'r of Corr., N.C. Bd. of Corr. and Training, to Pearl Pritchard,
Central Falls, N.C. 1 (Mar. 15, 1955) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("Our
Training Schools are proving that these youngsters are not too hard to handle. The
trouble is, we are getting too many ....
The real trouble is in the home. Children have far
too much or too little. It is a question of being underprivileged or overprivileged.").
172. See COMM'N ON JUV. CTs. & CORR. INSTS., supra note 166, at 20 ("As to what the
General Assembly should do at this session, this commission cannot make a
recommendation for the reason that its members are not unanimous, and the proposed bill
has not been studied.").
173. See id. at 9 ("One of the greatest weaknesses in the entire field of treating juvenile
delinquency is the lack of funds for sufficient trained workers to assist the courts.
Whatever the wisdom of the judge, the State cannot expect the juvenile courts to march
toward a solution of these human problems without the use of its eyes and arms.").
174. See H.B. 396, 1955 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1955) (proposing that juvenile
court jurisdiction be extended to include sixteen-year-old first offenders charged with
misdemeanors other than motor vehicle offenses). First offenders were not sent to the
state's training schools. See Letter from Mrs. Tom Grier, Executive Sec'y for the N.C.
Conference for Soc. Serv., to The Honorable Luther H. Hodges, Governor of North
Carolina 1-2 (Mar. 15, 1955) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (recognizing
that first offenders are not sent to training schools).
175. See id. (stating that opposition to H.B. 396 was coming from clerks of court and
correctional personnel who contended that training schools could not handle the
additional age group, even though "representatives of the latter group admit that first
offenders are not sent to the training schools"). In addition, the letter's author
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Debate and discussion over issues related to the administration
of the juvenile courts continued through the late 1950s, when several
reports by commissions appointed by Governor Luther Hodges were
submitted to the General Assembly following in-depth studies of the
system.'77 In addition to the question of the proper jurisdiction of
juvenile court, among the areas examined were the procedural and
substantive laws governing delinquency court, the quality of
supervision provided to juveniles on probation, and the condition of
statewide services and facilities for at-risk youth. 7 '
The first of these reports, from the Governor's Youth Service
Commission, called for the enactment of legislation extending the
juvenile court age to eighteen, premised on the grounds that children
aged sixteen to eighteen were a "lost" group from the "standpoint of
state and community resources"17 9 and that North Carolina was
among only a small minority of states not extending protection to
these older adolescents. 8 ' The report also found that an extension of
jurisdiction-and, thus, treatment and services-was justified because
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were most likely to get in trouble
through "idleness" resulting from school attendance laws that
permitted sixteen-year-olds to leave school; labor laws that prohibited
employment of children under age eighteen; and armed forces
regulations that forbade sixteen-year-olds from enlisting without
parental consent. 8 ' The report characterized the juvenile court
system as "weak and outmoded" and called for the establishment of a
system of family courts that would be state-administered and
financed, one that would "substitute diagnosis and therapy for the
philosophy of guilt and punishment," thereby lowering recidivism
rates.182
recommended that qualified judges be appointed to serve in juvenile court, because many
clerks of court who serve as juvenile court judges are not qualified and "complain of the
burden" of the position. Id.
176. See INST. OF GOV'T, DAILY BULLETIN, Feb. 28, 1955, at 1 (recording that H.B.
396 was introduced on this date); INST. OF GOV'T, DAILY BULLETIN, Mar. 24, 1955, at 3
(recording that H.B. 396 was "reported unfavorably"-or rejected--on this date).
177. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 17.
178. See id. at 21-29.
179. THE GOVERNOR'S YOUTH SERV. COMM'N, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S

YOUTH SERV. COMM'N 3 (1956) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
180. Id. (stating that North Carolina is one of only five states that ends jurisdiction at
age sixteen, that twelve states end it at seventeen, and that some "go as high as" twentyone years of age).
181. Id.
182. Id. (stating that a family court system would "decrease the number of
commitments of children to state correctional institutions and of youthful offenders to the
Prison System of the state"); see also supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing
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The following year, the National Probation and Parole
Association filed a report further evaluating the need for a state-wide
system of family courts for North Carolina. 18 3 The report addressed
how best to provide effective court services and facilities for children
and families regardless of socioeconomic status or location, again
characterizing children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen as a
Renewing the
"lost" group under North Carolina law.' 84
recommendation to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to
eighteen, the 1957 report advanced an argument expressed fifty years
later by the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 185 which
invalidated the death penalty for offenders under eighteen. 186 Both

the 1957 report and the Court argued that basic equity is
compromised when sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are considered

adults for certain purposes (i.e., committing crimes) but not others
(i.e., voting). 187 Presaging the reasoning relied upon in Simmons and

utilized by contemporary raise-the-age advocates, the report's authors
argued that research in the fields of physiology and psychology
in detail the contention that raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to eighteen would
lower recidivism rates and increase public safety).
183. THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, A SYSTEM OF FAMILY COURTS FOR NORTH

CAROLINA (1957); see also Press Release, The Office of the Governor of North Carolina,
supra note 86 (announcing the recommendation that a state-wide system of family courts
be established and that the juvenile court age be raised to eighteen). The study was
funded at no expense to the state, with some of the cost absorbed by the non-profit itself,
and the remainder covered by outside grants. ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 23.
184. See THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, supra note 183, at 12 ("The problem in
its broad form was easy to identify, for it is a problem common, in a greater or lesser
degree, to each of our forty-eight states: how to provide for all children and families in
trouble good court services and facilities, not only for those who happen to reside in a
large, relatively wealthy urban area, and one in which the citizens of the community are
willing to devote an adequate portion of that wealth to such services."). Id. at 18-19 ("As
has been pointed out by the Governor's Youth Service Commission in its report to
Governor Hodges, children who have reached the 16th birthday but have not yet reached
the 18th constitute a kind of 'lost' group under North Carolina law.").
185. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
186. Id. at 568.
187. Compare THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, supra note 183, at 19 ("In essence,
they are legally children in almost every respect except responsibility for offenses against
the law and compulsory school attendance. They are not permitted to marry without
parental consent; they cannot vote; the types of employment in which they may engage are
legally limited; and they are subject to parental authority. Yet, if one of them steals a car,
picks a pocket, or takes a ten cent object from a store without paying for it, he
immediately becomes an adult.") with Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569 ("In recognition of the
comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits
those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental
consent."), and 574 ("The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line
for death eligibility ought to rest.").
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supported the contention that offenders under eighteen should not be

considered as culpable or criminally responsible as adults because
they are not yet fully formed. 8 8 The report stated:
During the past twenty or thirty years ... our knowledge shows

that it is unreasonable to classify a sixteen or seventeen year old
youngster as an adult in connection with offenses against
society.

The period of physiological and psychological change which,
in the human being, is known as adolescence is the period
during which the natural human drives (the drive for
recognition, the aggressive drive, the drive for love, and so on)
are at their peak strength; and, in the average youngster, the
inner controls necessary to keep these drives within bounds are
not yet fully developed. In fact that part of the brain (the
cortex) that is the seat of the individual's reasoning power does
189
not reach full physical growth until after the age of eighteen.

The last report of this era, the 1958 Bell Report, again raised the
question of whether the age of juvenile court jurisdiction should be
extended, lowered, or left unchanged. 9 0

This report, unlike the

previous ones, did not explicitly recommend any particular age, but it
instead urged clarity on the question.' 91 Similar to the other reports,

however, it did acknowledge that North Carolina was in the minority
of states because of its very low jurisdictional age.'92

188. See Simmons, 543 U.S. at 569-70, 572-73 (holding that, because juveniles under
eighteen are different from adults in terms of maturity, vulnerability to outside pressures,
character, personality, and brain development, they cannot be classified among the worst
offenders); THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, supra note 183, at 19-20, 38 (asserting
that the North Carolina court system fails to provide appropriate services for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds, adolescents who are not yet fully matured emotionally, physically, or
neurologically and are not considered to be adults with respect to other aspects of their
lives); see also ACTION FOR CHILDREN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 53, at 3-7 (relying
on scientific research on adolescent brain development to argue that, because teenagers'
brains are still developing adult reasoning capabilities, the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction should be raised to eighteen).
189. THE NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N, supra note 183, at 19.
190. See Roddey M. Ligon, Jr., A Report on the Domestic Relations Courts in North
Carolina, the Juvenile Courts in North Carolina, and the Juvenile Courts of Other States,
POPULAR GOV'T, June 1958, at 3, 28-29.
191. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 28-29. But see Crosswell, supranote 107,
at 3 (reporting in 1959 that the commissioner of Public Welfare for North Carolina
supported raising the age based on reasons of equity, the stigma of an adult criminal
record, and the fact that N.C. was in the minority of states on this issue).
192. See Ligon, supra note 190, at 41-42 (stating that in twenty-eight jurisdictions, the
upper age is eighteen; in six states the upper age is seventeen; in five states, including
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Several years were to pass before formal legislative action was

taken to effectuate any of the changes recommended in these reports,
and the issue of raising the jurisdictional age was not among them. 3
Thus, while this period may be characterized as "a time of studies"
that generated multiple proposals for the extension
of juvenile court
19 4
jurisdiction, there were few concrete results.
C.

Continued Reluctance to Join the Majority

Although state commissions and advocacy groups have
continued to examine the topic-albeit on a more limited basis than
in decades past-their recommendations and proposals have again

been met with either uncompromising resistance or marked
indifference, leaving reams of committee reports, meeting minutes,
and failed bills with little to show for it.' 95

In recent years, for

instance, governor-appointed committees released several reports
either recommending that the age of juvenile court jurisdiction be
raised to age eighteen, or seriously considering the issue but stopping
short of endorsing an extension.196 The first of these occurred in the
mid-1960s with the release of a report by a committee appointed
specifically to study the juvenile court age. 97 Similar to earlier

efforts, the report's authors concurred that age eighteen is a "more
logical breaking point" between childhood and adulthood than

sixteen, particularly in light of an adolescent's emotional maturity,
judgment, conscience, and impulse-control. 198 The authors also gave

weight to the fact that North Carolina was one of only six states at the
time that did not have eighteen as its upper age limit for juvenile

North Carolina, it is sixteen; in three states it is twenty-one; and in seven states there are
special provisions regarding age jurisdiction).
193. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 25. Among the recommended changes
that were eventually the subject of legislative action in North Carolina were the following:
the establishment of a uniform state-wide district court system with a separate court that
would have jurisdiction over matters concerning children and the family; adequate funding
for secure detention facilities and training schools; and appropriate training of probation
staff in the areas of adolescent development and treatment. Id. at 34-36.
194. Id. at 30.
195. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
197. See SUBCOMM. OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY &
YOUTH CRIME, REPORT TO GOVERNOR TERRY SANFORD TO STUDY THE JUVENILE
COURT AGE (196_) (exact year unknown) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
198. Id. at 4; see also supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text (discussing a 1957
report that advocated for raising the age based, in part, upon psychological and
physiological evidence that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds have more in common with
adolescents than adults).
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court.199 The committee ultimately recommended that the age be
raised to eighteen, with exceptions for sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds charged with felonies having a maximum punishment exceeding
ten years, and for those charged with either misdemeanors or felonies
having a maximum penalty of less than ten years, "if the instance
requires it." 2"

Such a proposal would have created a scheme that left

the question of whether to prosecute sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
as adults or juveniles within the discretion of the prosecutor or
judge.2"'
The committee qualified its proposal, however, by
recommending that such legislation be effective only upon
establishing a statewide family court system or upon certifying that
the Board of Juvenile Correction had adequate training school

facilities, whichever occurred first."° The authors also recommended
that sufficient funding be appropriated and that state matching funds
be provided for detention facilities for sixteen- and seventeen-year2 3
olds so that the law might become effective "as soon as possible.""

Consistent with past pattern and practice, the proposal failed to
advance in the General Assembly."

While there was some expressed interest in the issue during the
late 1960s and early 1970s,

°5

the next extended legislative discussion

199. See THE SUBCOMM. OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
& YOUTH CRIME, supra note 197, at 4.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id. ("That in [the] case of children between 16 and 18 years of age, and as to
felonies, whenever the punishment cannot exceed ten years, they may, if the instance
requires it, be bound over to the Superior Court to be prosecuted under the criminal law
appertaining to the charge."). The proposal offered no further details as to how-or by
whom-the transfer decision would be made. Id.
202. Id.; see also supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing a 1953
government-commissioned report that also recommended raising the jurisdictional age
only if sufficient numbers of training schools had been established).
203.

THE SUBCOMM. OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY &

YOUTH CRIME, supra note 197, at 5-6.

204. See N.C. CTS. COMM'N, supra note 108, at 17-18 (stating that the Commission
"struggled with" the issue of the proper age jurisdiction for juvenile court before
ultimately concluding that the age should not be raised).
205.

See, e.g., MASON P. THOMAS, JR., JUVENILE COURT REVISIONS BY THE 1969

GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (1969) ("There was also some feeling that the age jurisdiction of
the district court in juvenile cases should include children who are 16 or 17; the
Commission concluded that for the present, juvenile jurisdiction in the district court
should include only children less than 16 years of age."); GOVERNOR'S YOUTH
ADVISORY

COMM.

ON

YOUTH

DEVELOPMENT,

REPORT

OF THE

GOVERNOR'S

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 21 (1973) (identifying whether to
increase the juvenile age jurisdiction as an area "requiring legislation"); Meeting Minutes
from the N.C. Courts Commission (Oct. 20, 1967-Feb. 14, 1969) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (noting repeated instances in which the issue of raising the age of
juvenile court jurisdiction was discussed). The interest in extending the jurisdictional age
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did not occur until 1 9 8 5 .206 At that time, proponents of raising the age
again focused on the inequities in prosecuting sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds as adults while denying them such privileges as the ability to

enter into a contract or to marry without parental consent.2°0
Advocates stated that "ample evidence" of how best to extend
juvenile court jurisdiction could be found in the laws of the many
states that used eighteen as the upper limit; they reiterated that older
2 °8
adolescents had an urgent need for more appropriate treatment;
and they concluded by asserting that adult prisons were
"inappropriate" for young people, as they were unequipped for
treatment and rehabilitation.2 9 While the issue was addressed further
on several occasions by various legislative bodies during this period,

the only action ever taken was a recurring recommendation that a
future study commission be funded and staffed to "deal with this
21
problem." °

In the areas of juvenile justice policy and legislation, the decade
of the 1990s was notable for a dramatic national escalation in the

during these years was met at each turn by stark opposition. See supra notes 108-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the opposition to efforts to raise the age during the 1960s
and 1970s).
206. See JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N 1987, supra note 117, at E-19 to E-24
(reporting an extended discussion of a proposal to raise the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction to eighteen during a Mar. 25, 1985, meeting of the Juvenile Law Study
Commission). Interestingly, this discussion took place just two months after a discussion
by the same commission regarding whether sixteen- and seventeen-year-old crime suspects
should have the right to a parent present during police questioning. Id. at E-4 (minutes of
Jan. 14, 1985, meeting of Juvenile Law Study Commission). It was recognized during this
earlier discussion that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds were still in the age category of
"individuals who needed the full opportunity to have parents or guardians present to assist
or to counsel them and that they were still juveniles emotionally whether or not they were
'juveniles' according to the law." Id.; see also Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child:
InterrogatingJuveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 406-32
(2008) (arguing that, because of the psychological and brain development of juveniles,
they are particularly vulnerable to traditional police interrogation techniques and should
be given protections similar to those provided to child victims and witnesses who are
questioned).
207. See THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N 1987, supra note 117, at E-19 to E-20.
208. See id. at E-20, E-24 (stating that it was "the collective judgment of the country"
that eighteen should be the juvenile jurisdictional age, and that it was an "issue of
fairness").
209. Id. at E-20.
210. See, e.g., THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE 1989 GENERAL ASSEMBLY, G.A. 1989, at E-10, E-21, E-22 (1989) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that the issue of raising the age was discussed
on several occasions, including Dec. 30, 1988, when it was emphasized that the
Commission had "historically been opposed to raising the juvenile age and would continue
to take this stand," and recommending that a study group be created to address the issue).
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punitive responses to children charged with criminal offenses,21 1
triggered in large part by a perceived increase in the rate of teenage
crime."' Statistics reflect that, from 1992 through 1999, forty-nine
211. See ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 122 (stating that the early 1990s were
notable for a growing tendency to return to a punitive "get tough" attitude toward juvenile
crime); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME 59-61 (July 1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf (finding
that as a result of the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise, the majority of states
changed their laws during the early 1990s, resulting in a generally more punitive juvenile
justice system); Ira J. Hadnot, MeasuringMaturity; Laws Regulating Juveniles Have Their
Ups and Downs, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2001, at 1J (describing the
public perception that juvenile crime was escalating, and the ensuing changes in juvenile
codes); Joseph Perkins, FightingJuvenile Violence, Preventing Some Kids From Becoming
Crime Statistics, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 24, 1995, at B7 (predicting an
"explosive increase" in crimes committed by juveniles). There were also increasingly
punitive responses to juvenile crime in North Carolina during the 1990s. See, e.g., Steve
Riley, Juvenile Crime Advisers Adopt Tough Stance, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Oct. 27, 1993, at 3A (reporting that the governor's crime advisers "recommended that he
push for larger training schools, more detention cells, [and] military-style boot camps" to
enable the state to "get tougher on violent teenagers"); Steve Riley, Juvenile Crimes Rise,
but Easley's Data Puzzle Legislators, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 1, 1994, at
3A (reporting that Attorney General Mike Easley stated that "state lawmakers should get
tougher on increasingly violent children," and that "juveniles don't respect or fear current
laws and sanctions"); see also Susan L. Spence, Our Juvenile Criminals, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 23, 1980, at 4-1 (reporting that, while fewer juveniles
were being committed to North Carolina's training schools, the ones sent there were
"tougher than ever").
212. While the media has consistently asserted that juvenile crime has been on the rise
since the 1990s, research studies suggest that this claim has little or no actual merit. See,
e.g., LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDi, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF
BALANCE:
YOUTH, RACE AND CRIME IN THE NEWS 4 (2001), available at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf ("In a 1996 California poll, 60%
of respondents reported believing that juveniles were responsible for most violent crime,
when youths were actually responsible for about 13% of violent crime that year."); J.
Robert Flores, Foreword to HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT iii (2006),
available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (finding that the
rate of juvenile violent crime arrests has decreased steadily since 1994, falling to a level
"not seen since at least the 1970s"); Mike A. Males, FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS
ABOUT THE NEXT GENERATION 32 (1998) (discussing the media's mischaracterization of
youth violence during the 1990s as "soaring," when it was actually falling); Julian V.
Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 499-503 (2004)
(finding that empirical research has shown that people overestimated the volume of crime
for which juveniles were responsible); JASON ZIEDENBERG, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR
YOUTH, JUVENILE CRIME FACT SHEET: SERIOUS SCHOOL CRIME & JUVENILE CRIME
CONTINUES TO DECLINE, http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/juvenilecrime/
factsheet.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (explaining that, in 1999, "71% of respondents
thought [a school shooting] was very likely or likely... [to] happen in their community,"
and "[i]n 1998, 62 percent of adults polled by the Building Blocks for Youth Initiative
believed youth crime was on the increase, at a time when it had dropped for five years to a
25-year low in the government's largest crime survey"); Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children

2008]

JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION

1489

states and the District of Columbia enacted or expanded their
transfer provisions, meaning that state legislatures increasingly moved
juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or the
seriousness of the offense charged.2 " North Carolina's lawmakers
followed suit with a series of particularly harsh bills aimed at

transferring more-and younger-offenders to adult criminal court
and removing the discretion for transfer decisions from prosecutors

and judges by making it mandatory in a growing subset of cases.214
While most of the proposed legislation failed in committee,215 the
1992 murder of an elderly woman by a young boy prompted the
General Assembly to lower the minimum age of transfer from
fourteen to thirteen.2 16 This change in the law meant that, for any
As Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the PotentialImpact of Roper v.
Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 179-181 (2007) (finding, based on statistical analysis,
that the perception that juvenile crime was increasing in the 1990s was "misguided").
213. Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Court, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
NATIONAL REPORT SERIES 4 (June 2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
html/ojjdp/195420/page4.html. But see id. at 3, available at http://www/ncjrs.govfhtml/
ojjdp/195420/page3.html (finding that during the 1990s only three states lowered the age
cap on original juvenile court jurisdiction: Wyoming lowered it from nineteen to eighteen,
and New Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered theirs from eighteen to seventeen).
214. See, e.g., THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
THE 1993 GEN. ASSEMBLY OF N.C., G.A. 1990-93, at 36, 38 (1993) (discussing and
providing a draft of a proposed bill that would create a presumption of transfer for
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds charged with Class B and C felonies, including first degree
burglary, first degree rape, and second degree murder); H. 28, 1994 Gen. Assemb., Extra
Sess. (N.C. 1994) (proposing that transfer to adult court be mandatory for all juveniles
fourteen years of age and older charged with a violent felony, as enumerated); H. 29, 1994
Gen. Assemb., Extra Sess. (N.C. 1994) (proposing that commitment to training school be
mandatory for delinquent juveniles aged ten, eleven, or twelve for any offense, and for
thirteen-year-olds and older for any offense, except Class A, B, C, D, or E felonies).
215. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE JUVENILE CODE, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N,
REPORT TO THE 1995 GEN. ASSEMBLY OF N.C., G.A. 1993-94, at 4-6, 19, A-3 (1995)
(rejecting H. 28, which proposed mandatory transfer for certain juveniles, based on the
lack of evidence indicating that transfer requests were being denied, and recommending
that discretion for transfer remain with the prosecutor and the judge with "due regard to
the offender's profile and the characteristics of the offense").
216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1994) ("The court after notice, hearing, and a
finding of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction over a juvenile to superior court if the
juvenile was 13 years of age or older at the time the juvenile allegedly committed an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult.") (current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7B-2200 (2007)); J. Andrew Curliss, Juvenile Justice Proposals Would Alter
Release Rules, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 1, 1998, at 1A (reporting the
"public outcry" over the murder, and that, as a result, legislators were considering a
"package of proposed changes in the state's juvenile justice laws"). According to the
statute, in determining whether to transfer jurisdiction, the court shall consider the
following: the age, maturity, intellectual functioning, and prior record of the juvenile;
prior attempts to rehabilitate the juvenile; the likelihood that the juvenile would benefit
from treatment or rehabilitation; whether the alleged offense was aggressive, violent, or
premeditated; and the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the public
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felony crime, the juvenile court could-either upon motion by the
prosecutor or sua sponte-transfer a child as young as thirteen to
superior court for trial as an adult.217
The brutal killing of ninety-year-old Mary Haddon by thirteen-

year-old Gregory Gibson stands out in recent North Carolina history
as a prime example of the way in which sensationalized crimes have
driven the laws and policies that affect juveniles. 8 Within days of the
murder, the public learned that, because Gibson was thirteen and not

fourteen, he could not be transferred to adult criminal court for trial,
and the most serious punishment he could receive was a commitment

to training school until age eighteen." 9 Soon after the autopsy results

confirmed the violent nature of the crime, 2

there were calls for

thirteen-year-olds could be
changing the juvenile transfer laws so that221
for their actions.

held "more accountable

requires that the juvenile be prosecuted as an adult. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2203
(2007); see also supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (discussing juvenile transfer laws
in North Carolina).
217. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200 (2007).
218. See Curliss, supra note 216, at 1A; Joby Warrick, From Troubled Teens to Violent
Adults, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 4,1996, at 1A (stating that "outrage"
over the murder of Mary Haddon resulted in changes to the transfer laws); see also
Editorial, Teen Crime, Punishment,NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 20, 1992, at
10A (reporting that Gibson's grandmother said the boy had been a "time bomb" after
living with his mother and stepfather for two years in a neighborhood where he was
bullied and beaten by older boys and made to steal from his family); Jane Stancill, Brash
Teen Bragged of Getting Car, Cash Before Brutal Slaying, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), June 18, 1992, at 14A (stating that car theft seemed to be the only motive for the
killing); infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
219. See Thomas Healy, Death Fuels Anger Over Laws Protecting Young Criminals,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 18, 1992, at 1A.
220. Joby Warrick & Jane Stancill, When Their Worlds Collided, Time Stood Still:
Fatal Meeting Took One Life, Forever Changed Another, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 12,1992, at 1A (reporting that Gibson severely beat Haddon to death, and that
she suffered more than forty-five blows to her head, neck, and chest from a hammer and
garden tool); Joby Warrick, Autopsy Report Underscores Brutality of Durham Slaying,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 1, 1992, at 3B.
221. Warrick, supra note 220. The succeeding chapters in the case, in which Gibson
committed suicide at age twenty after being charged with a second murder, are both tragic
and cautionary. See John Sullivan & Michelle Kurtz, Prisoner Who Had Killed at 13
Hangs Self in Jail, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 14, 1998, at 1A; Dawn
Wotapka, Man Who Murdered at Age 13 Held Again, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Aug. 30, 1998, at IA. After Gibson's suicide it was discovered that, at the time of
the second killing, he should have been incarcerated, serving the remainder of a sentence
for assault on a female; instead, a series of administrative errors had led to his early
release. See John Sullivan, Release Mistake Let Durham Slayer Kill Again, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1998, at 1A.
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In the wake of the Gibson case, the creation of the Commission
on Juvenile Crime and Justice in 1997 was met with enthusiasm.22 2
The Commission was established by Governor Jim Hunt, who won
re-election to his fourth term with a platform that included fighting
and reducing juvenile crime. 23 Meeting public expectations, the
Commission successfully accomplished the ambitious tasks of
rewriting the Juvenile Code-which included changing the stated

objective of juvenile delinquency dispositions from the "least
restrictive

disposition"

to

the

"most

restructuring the state's juvenile justice

effective"

agency.2 25

one 22 -and

The issue of

extending the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, however, was absent
from the Commission's working agenda.22 6

222. See, e.g., Joseph Neff, Hunt Wants Action on Juvenile Crime, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 8, 1997, at 3A (reporting the excitement and optimism felt by some
in the legal community towards the work of the Commission); see also Joseph Neff, Hunt
Nudges Panel on Juvenile Justice, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 20, 1997, at
1A (describing the Commission's recommendations for overhauling the juvenile justice
system and Gov. Hunt's determination to have the group's final report by Jan. 1998).
223. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 101, at

1; Danny Lineberry, Gov. Hunt Lays Out '96 Re-election Agenda, 50-Page Plan Stresses
Education, Personal Responsibility, THE HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Sept. 4, 1996, at
C1 (stating that Gov. Hunt called for a "complete overhaul" of the laws that deal with
juvenile offenders, and proposing that fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds who commit violent
crimes be tried as adults); Kirsten B. Mitchell, Hunt Seeks Teacher Raises, Crackdown on
Youth Crime, WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, Sept. 4, 1996, at 3B (reporting that Gov.
Hunt called for a "complete revision" of the Juvenile Code and recommended that firsttime juvenile offenders be punished more severely).
224. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 19-

20 (recommending that juvenile delinquency dispositions follow the national trend of
placing greater weight on the protection of public safety than on child protection and
treatment); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2500 (2007) (emphasizing the promotion of
public safety with no mention of "[the] least restrictive disposition"); Joseph Neff, Juvenile
Justice Reforms Drafted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 10, 1998, at 1A
(reporting that the Buncombe County District Attorney favored deleting language from
the law that directed judges to impose the least restrictive alternative on juvenile
delinquents, as it had sent the message that the system is "a joke").
225.

GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 3-

18, 38-46; see also Juvenile Justice Reform Act, S. 1998-202 (S-1260) (N.C. 1998) (enacting
many of the Commission's recommendations, including substantial changes in the
procedures and sanctions that apply to delinquent juveniles).
226. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 101, at

4-5 ("The maximum age of original jurisdiction for delinquent juveniles should remain up
until the 16th birthday."). But see id. at 4 (recommending that, for dispositional purposes,
juvenile jurisdiction be extended from age eighteen to age twenty-one, resulting in "more
appropriate, longer rehabilitative treatment" as well as fewer transfers from juvenile to
adult court, "where rehabilitation is unlikely to occur"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1602 (2007)
(extending jurisdiction to age twenty-one for a delinquent juvenile committed to a youth
development center for first-degree murder, first-degree rape, or first-degree sexual
offense, and to age nineteen for a delinquent juvenile committed to a youth development
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While the Commission acknowledged that North Carolina was
now one of only three states to prosecute sixteen-year-olds in adult
court, it recommended against increasing the age for old and familiar
reasons: that raising the original jurisdictional age would have a
"detrimental impact on [the] already overburdened system"; that
public opinion would be against the change, particularly in light of the
"serious rise" in crimes being committed by children under sixteen;
and that budgetary projections would be "exorbitant." ' 7 Following
another long-established pattern, although the Commission had
estimated that $42 million would be needed to bring its plans to
fruition, the General Assembly budgeted only $19 million for the
formation of a single agency to handle the administration of the
system-opting once again for a short-term fix, rather than a longterm solution.228
Seven years later, following the arrest of four dozen students in
the Alamance-Burlington School System for felony drug distribution
charges, there was renewed interest in the issue of juvenile court
jurisdiction. 229
Among those arrested in the undercover drug
operation was JamesOn Curry, a local high school basketball player
whose offer to attend the University of North Carolina on a full
athletic scholarship was rescinded after he pled guilty to six felony

center for other serious felonies). If this law, which was passed in 1998, had been in effect
at the time of Mary Haddon's murder, Gregory Gibson could have been committed to
training school until age twenty-one. See An Act to Amend and Recodify the North
Carolina Juvenile Code, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 202 § 6, available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/1997/Bills/Senate/HTML/S1260v2.html.
227. See GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 101, at

4; see also supra notes 98-123 and accompanying text (discussing the tone and tenor of the
opposition to raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction during this period).
228. See Michael Grossman, Juvenile Justice System Headed For Major Reform, NEWS
& RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Aug. 2, 1998, at B1 (reporting that the G.A. pared down
Gov. Hunt's $42 million request to approximately $19 million, with the difference in cost
attributed primarily to delaying the expansion of training schools); Lynette Blair Mitchell,
Juvenile Justice System Going Through an Awkward Age of Trying Youths as Adults,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 20,1996, at 1B (stating that the budget for the
state juvenile justice system for fiscal year 1995-96 was $19.5 million); see also Neff, supra
note 224 (reporting concern on the part of state legislators over the costs of implementing
the Commission's recommendations, with one state representative expressing fear that
"we have created a monster that we can't afford"). The same concerns over inadequate
funding for the juvenile justice system have continued to the present day. See Schrader,
supra note 75 (reporting in 2008 that the N.C. Secretary of Juvenile Justice has appealed
to the legislature for an estimated $1.9 million to staff youth development centers).
229. See Martha Quillin, Student Drug Arrests Jolt Alamance, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 6, 2004, at lA. While the undercover officers bought mostly small
amounts of marijuana from the students, they also found cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and
various prescription medications. Id. at 8A.
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As other teens were

convicted, they learned that they could be denied jobs because of
their criminal convictions and would lose their right to vote and to use

a firearm for recreational purposes, among other collateral
consequences. 2 1 As complaints grew over the impact of the criminal
charges on these young people, the public as well as lawmakers took

notice; State Rep. Alice Bordsen of Alamance County was soon
prompted to initiate a proposal

to allow nonviolent youthful

offenders either to have their felony convictions reduced to
misdemeanors or have them expunged.2 32 After the proposal failed to

advance, Bordsen turned her sights to raising the age.233
Since 2006, North Carolina's raise-the-age advocates have
become more vocal, and the movement has received increased
attention from the news media. 34 Yet, the pattern has continued.
Despite a well-researched and persuasive report by the Sentencing
235
and Policy Advisory Committee and new legislative proposals,
progress has stalled in light of opposition from familiar
230. Id.; see also Ira Berkow, A Star. An Arrest. A Second Chance., N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2004, at D5.
231. See Blythe, supra note 77; see also supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text
(discussing potential collateral consequences of a criminal record).
232. Bill Would Lighten Youthful Offender Penalties, SHELBY STAR, Jan. 2, 2005,
available at http://www.mpp.org/states/north-carolina/news/bill-would-lighten-youthfuloffe.html.
233. See, e.g., Blyth, supra note 77, at A25; Kane, supra note 121 (reporting in 2006 that
the N.C. Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission took up the study of raising the age
of juvenile court jurisdiction at the request of Alice Bordsen); Barry Smith, Rep. Bordsen
Wants Courts to Treat Kids as Kids, TIMES-NEWS (Burlington, N.C.), Mar. 25, 2007,
article.html/adultjuvenile.
available at http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/court-163
html.
234. See, e.g., Editorial, ... No, They're Not Adults, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 26, 2007, at 8A (advocating that raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction is
the "compassionate, progressive" way to address crime committed by teenagers);
Editorial, supra note 93 (calling in 2006 for North Carolina to join the "national
mainstream" by extending the juvenile court age to eighteen); Editorial, Young and
Fixable, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 11, 2007, at 10A (arguing, based on
common sense and science, that N.C. should include sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds
under juvenile court jurisdiction); Jennifer Fernandez, Charging Kids as Adults,
GREENSBORO NEWS RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), Dec. 6, 2007, at Al (discussing the
debate in North Carolina over whether to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to
eighteen); David Ingram, Report: Let 16-Year-Olds Be Juveniles, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Dec. 6, 2007, at 2B (discussing the movement in North Carolina to raise the
juvenile court age cap to eighteen); Kane, supra note 121 (discussing in 2006 the N.C.
Sentencing Commission's study of whether the state should raise the age).
235. See N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 3, 8-9
(recommending that juvenile court jurisdiction be extended to age eighteen, except for
traffic offenses committed by persons sixteen and older); H.B. 492, supra note 109
(proposing that juvenile court jurisdiction be extended to eighteen).
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In 2007, the Governor's Crime Commission was

granted permission to study the matter further; recommendations,
once again, are pending. 237 The next Part identifies several factors
that have likely contributed to North Carolina's failure to join the

majority.
IV. THE FACTORS AT PLAY
The recurring pattern of defeat of legislative proposals despite

the support of a strong coalition of proponents is certainly not unique
to the issue of raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in North
Carolina. 238 There are many areas of law and policy that have been
plagued by this type of legislative paralysis in which broadlysupported bills have repeatedly and inexplicably failed to advance.239

While it is impossible to know precisely why the proposals have
failed, this Part suggests several possible explanations.2 4 °

The first is the self-perpetuating claim by opponents that the
state lacks the necessary resources and that an already underfunded
system should not be expanded.

As discussed previously, this

argument was the most likely reason that the 1919 statute establishing
a statewide juvenile court system capped jurisdiction at age sixteen
236. See Blyth, supra note 77 (stating in 2007 that the N.C. Conference of District
Attorneys and the N.C. Sheriff's Association opposed raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction based on the costs involved); Dan Kane, Bill to Raise Age to be Tried as Adult
Falters, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 22, 2007, at 5B (reporting that concerns
about the cost of raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction and the substandard
condition of the state's juvenile justice facilities caused the sponsoring state representative
to "rework [the] legislation so that the measure would be studied instead"); Moriarity et
al., supra note 121 (quoting an opponent of raising the age as stating that it would "clog up
that court system," crime victims would "get relief much later," and juveniles who commit
major crimes will only "[get] their wrists slapped"); see also supra notes 114-21 and
accompanying text (discussing the grounds for opposition to raising the age expressed by
law enforcement and prosecutors).
237. See Stanley B. Chambers Jr., Grappling with Age of Adult Trial, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (West ed.), Feb. 15, 2008, at 1B (reporting that permission was
granted to study the matter further and that a report is expected in 2009); Ingram, supra
note 114, at 2B (reporting that the legislation sponsored in 2007 to raise the age never
made it to the House floor and that legislators are now considering a study).
238. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News
Media, 41 HOuS. L. REV. Winter 2004, at 1091, 1093 (discussing the unsuccessful efforts by
proponents to enact omnibus bankruptcy legislation over a seven-year period, despite
strong bipartisan support from lawmakers).
239. Id.
240. This Part is not intended to provide a full or complete analysis of all the possible
reasons for North Carolina's failure to join the majority but is intended merely to identify
several potential causes. The question of causality as it relates to the legislative process in
general, as well as to North Carolina specifically, is one for which further research and
scholarship clearly is needed.
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rather than eighteen.24' It has also been one of the most frequently
stated reasons given by politicians and lawmakers since that time. 42
In fact, a recent News & Observer article covering the raise-the-age

campaign reported once again that "[t]hose against raising the cutoff
age say it would be expensive, [and] would overburden the criminal
justice system.

243

The questions of how much the state should invest in its juvenile
justice system and whether to expand to provide for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds charged with criminal offenses are linked. A
familiar dynamic has developed in which the underfunded condition
of the system as well as the significant costs of expansion have been
repeatedly used to justify opposition to proposals to raise the
jurisdictional age to eighteen. 2' At the same time, legislators have
been consistently unwilling to allocate sufficient funding for the

current system.2 " In other words, while there is certainly truth to the
claim that the juvenile court system has perpetually struggled to

provide for those youngsters under its aegis, it is equally true that the
political will to fully fund a system that provides comprehensive

241. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text and notes 143-45 and accompanying
text (discussing the Juvenile Court Statute of 1919).
242. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
243. Chambers, supra note 237; see also infra note 244.
244. See, e.g.,

GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON JUVENILE CRIME AND JUSTICE,

supra note

101, at 4 (recommending in 1998 that the age of juvenile court jurisdiction not be extended
because "budgetary projections would be exorbitant"); THE JUVENILE LAW STUDY
COMM'N 1987, supra note 210, at E-21 (reporting opposition to a 1985 proposal to raise
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction based on the estimated $3 million cost of hiring
additional juvenile court counselors), E-22 (reporting opposition based on the nearly $40
million cost of constructing two new secure facilities to house sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds as well as the "fiscal impact" of hiring additional attorneys and psychologists and
providing more psychiatric services, vocational programs, substance abuse counselors, and
educational programs); Katie Mosher, Raise Age Cutoff for Adult Court, Group Says,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 17, 1990, at 5B (reporting opposition to raising
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in 1990 and quoting a chief juvenile court counselor
as stating that while there is some merit in the proposal, such a change cannot come
without additional funding from the state, so as not to "compromise what we are trying to
do with the younger kids").
245. See, e.g., ALLEY & WILSON, supra note 30, at 121 (stating that "insufficient funds
to employ needed staff and purchase and develop services and facilities" was one of the
hindrances to improving the juvenile justice system); see also Barbara Barrett, Juvenile
Justice Costs Rise, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Durham Ed.), May 25, 1999, at B3
(reporting that the Durham County juvenile court system has cost taxpayers "hundreds of
thousands of dollars" by sending children outside the county for specialized care, and that
county and community leaders are attempting to "tackle the problem of rising court
related costs").
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the

children-whatever

age

demographic-has long been lacking.246

The next step for advocates is to determine how best to reframe
the debate. How can legislators, policymakers, and-perhaps most
importantly-the general public be persuaded to support and fully

fund a juvenile court system that meets the treatment, rehabilitation,
and counseling needs of all its children, including sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders? The cyclical history of the movement
to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in North Carolina,
discussed in Part III, suggests that the General Assembly is not likely

to approve legislation to expand the system until this shift in opinion
occurs; lawmakers must first be convinced that their most critical
constituency-the voting public-is behind the reform effort.
Research indicates that one reason for the lack of public support
is the long-lasting power of the specter of youth violence. The
narrative of the "bad seed," the irredeemable violent youth who
threatens the safety of "our neighborhoods," has had enduring force
nationwide since the 1980s.247 In 1993, leading legislators in North

Carolina considering proposals to raise the age admitted that
troubled children inevitably get thrust to the "bottom of the budget
'food chain' " by groups whose causes are considered more
sympathetic,

248

and that "change is likely to come slowly.

' 24 9

In 2008,

Durham's police chief stated that he favors keeping the juvenile court
246. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (stating that lawmakers do not
consider comprehensive funding of the juvenile court system to be politically viable).
247. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 212, at 3 (stating that there is evidence
that stereotyping is affecting the treatment that young people experience in the juvenile
justice system and that despite sharp declines in youth crime, the public continues to
express great fear of its own young people); Barbara Fedders, Randy Hertz & Steve
Weymouth, The Defense Attorney's Perspective on Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR
CHILDREN'S FUTURE:

NEW APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND

YOUTH

VIOLENCE 84, 88 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 2002) ("Politicians and policy advocates have
...urged harsher treatment for today's youthful offenders, largely on the premise that
they represent a more malevolent breed of offender than their predecessors."); Barry C.
Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
MINN. L. REV. 965, 966-86 (1995) (finding that, when the growing fear of youth crime
combines with the desire to "get tough," there is political impetus to increase punitive
sanctions for young offenders); Michael Welch et al., Moral Panic Over Youth Violence:
Wilding and the Manufacture of Menace in the Media, 34 YOUTH & SOCIETY 1, 3-5 (2002)
(stating that panic over perceived threats to public safety reinforces criminal stereotypes,
particularly the perception that young men of color constitute a dangerous class); see also
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS:

COURT
248.
249.
delayed

RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE

189-244 (1999) (analyzing the criminalizing of serious young offenders).
Riley, supra note 102.
Id. (stating that legislators warned that a major report on the issue would be
for at least two years).

2008]

JUVENILE CO UR T JURISDICTION

1497

age limit at sixteen because "criminals are getting younger."

0

The

state's politicians have suggested that the stalemate over juvenile
court jurisdiction has persisted because legislators "can't identify with
the problem.

,251

The news media, too, has played its part in
22

reinforcing the stereotype of the "super-predator.,

1

There is also evidence that various sensationalized crimes have

served to drive juvenile justice policy in recent decades-a prime
example being the way in which Gregory Gibson's murder of Mary
Haddon prompted legislators to lower the age of eligibility for adult
prosecution from fourteen to thirteen.2 3 The theory that the process

of reforming juvenile justice laws has often had the hallmarks of a
"moral panic" has been discussed at length elsewhere.

4

The premise

is that, in the wake of a particular crime or series of incidents,
politicians, the media, and the public reinforce each other in a pattern

of "escalating alarm" about the threat of youth violence and the
urgent need to respond. 55 While it is not surprising that public
outrage over a brutal killing by a teenager has triggered the passage
of punitive reforms, it is much less likely that the public will be

250. Chambers, supra note 237.
251. Riley, supra note 102 (quoting N.C. Lt. Gov. Dennis Wicker).
252. John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators,WEEKLY STANDARD,
Nov. 27, 1995, at 23 (coining the term "super-predator"); PETER ELIKANN,
SUPERPREDATORS:

THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 41-42, 66

(1999); Joyce Purnick, Youth Crime: Should Laws Be Tougher?, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996,
at B1 (quoting prosecutor as characterizing juvenile delinquents as "superpredators"); see
also DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 212, at 17-26 (finding that youth rarely appear
in the news, but that when they do, it is connected to violence); Feld, supra note 247, at
982-86 (finding that mass media coverage of youth crime shapes public opinion and
political perceptions, indirectly influencing the legislative process); Spence, supra note 211,
at 4-1 (reporting in 1980 that juvenile criminals in North Carolina are "tough and getting
tougher"); Welch, supra note 247, at 22 (finding that the media's exaggerated attention to
youth violence continues to "resonate[] in the public imagination" and attaches a "stark
criminal stereotype" to young men of color). Studies have also found that a combination
of racism, media framing, and public discourse about crime as a problem of the black
urban poor has led to the racialization of crime, and that, as a consequence of news
coverage, "any discussion of crime today is essentially a discussion about race."
DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 212, at 20-21.

253. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 829, 868-77 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 351-52 (2006);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 806-09
(2003) (describing how public, legislative, and media responses to the perceived threat of
juvenile offenders interacted to create a "moral panic").
255. Scott, supra note 254, at 352.
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similarly inspired to mobilize on behalf of sixteen- and seventeenyear-olds charged with criminal offenses.256
An additional factor at play in North Carolina's failure to join
the majority is the continued reluctance of the bench and bar to view
juvenile court as a critical forum requiring specialization and
commitment from its participants, rather than as a mere training
ground for inexperienced judges and lawyers. As discussed in Part
III, after the legislature established a statewide system of juvenile
courts in 1919, some judges were hostile to the court's emphasis on
treatment and rehabilitation rather than incarceration or other more
punitive measures." 7 As the decades have passed, this hostility has
been replaced by indifference and a tendency to marginalize juvenile
court practice.258
Particularly after the policies of the 1990s
transferred large numbers of young offenders from juvenile to adult
court, many in the legal community considered judges and lawyers
practicing in delinquency court to be engaged in either glorified social
work or trivial law practice.2 9 Such attitudes and perceptions have
translated into the practice of training inexperienced prosecutors and
defenders in juvenile court until they are deemed ready to "graduate"
to one of the more respected forums, such as traffic or criminal
district court.260 Similarly, new judges often begin their tenure in
juvenile court before they move up to superior court where they
26
presumably will preside over matters of "greater import. '
256. See Welch et al., supra note 247, at 4 ("Compounded by sensationalistic news
coverage on.. stylized forms of lawlessness associated with urban teens, minority youths
remain a lightening rod for public fear, anger, and anxiety over impending social disorder,
all of which contribute to additional law and order campaigns.").
257. See supra notes 150-52.
258. See, e.g., Eric Collins, Public Defender Wants to Better Juvenile System, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 3, 2005, at B1 (reporting that juvenile court in North

Carolina is often "perceived as a place for young lawyers to cut their teeth and move on
because the stakes are not as high as in adult court").
259. Id.; see also Thomas F. Geraghty, Justicefor Children: How Do We Get There?, 88
J.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 234 (1997) (stating that many of the people who work in

juvenile court do not want to be there, and that both prosecutors and defense lawyers
"repeatedly have their efforts undermined by inefficient, ill-informed, or downright hostile

judges").
260. See Thomas L. Fowler, An Interview with Judge Marcia H. Morey, 9 N.C. ST. B. J.
43 (Spring 2004), available at http://www.ncbar.comljournal/archiveljournal-9,1.pdf#7 ("In

many district attorney's offices [in North Carolina], the newest prosecutors are often sent
down to juvenile court to get broken in-usually it's a short stint before they find their

stride and graduate to traffic court.").
261. Lisa Hoppenjans, Kernersville Man is State's First Juvenile Defender, WINSTON-

SALEM J. (Winston-Salem, N.C.), Nov. 26, 2004, at 1 (reporting that in "many legal
circles," juvenile court is known as "kiddy court," a steppingstone to "more important"
courts).
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This systemic marginalization of juvenile court practice in North
Carolina has perpetuated the conception that the juvenile justice
system is not worthy of the state's time, energy, or resources. While
there are a few counties in which the various players-judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys-remain committed to juvenile
court practice and develop a high level of professionalism and
expertise, these are the exceptions.262 When such a trend combines
with the pervasive specter of the adolescent superpredator, the
challenge of generating public support for comprehensive funding is
formidable, explaining-at least in part-why politicians and
lawmakers have long been unwilling to champion the issue of raising
the age. One would hope, however, that after many decades of
impasse, the General Assembly will overcome these obstacles and
bring North Carolina in line with the majority of states as well as with
the international community.
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the movement to raise the age of
juvenile court jurisdiction in North Carolina since 1915. Based upon
primary source materials and legislative records, the Article has
demonstrated that a recurring pattern has developed over the past
century: despite the backing of respected scholars, child welfare
experts, and the occasional politician, proposals to extend jurisdiction
to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds have been consistently defeated.
While causation cannot be definitively proven, the analysis identifies
several likely factors at play: legislators' use of the perpetually
underfunded state of the juvenile justice system to justify their refusal
to provide adequate services for North Carolina's at-risk children; the
enduring power of the specter of youth crime; and the
marginalization of juvenile court by both the bench and the bar.
Having examined the repeated attempts by advocates and
lawmakers to raise the age, it is clear that while the movement's
proponents have presented strong arguments grounded in empirical
research, the opposition's talking points have continued to resonate
262. Id. (reporting that "no one" wants to work in juvenile court and that very few
public defender offices in North Carolina hire full-time staff members to represent
juveniles); see also AM. BAR ASS'N, N.C.: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 2, 27-28 (Lynn
Grindall & Patricia Puritz eds., 2003) (finding that the quality of juvenile defense
representation in North Carolina is uneven, and that, in some counties, juvenile defense
attorneys "have become so marginalized in the process they seemed to have no role at
all").
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with lawmakers and the public. Stated concerns regarding lack of

funding, burdening law enforcement, and coddling young criminals
have persistently overcome statistics, neuroscience, and predictions of
increased public safety. Yet, there is little evidence that the various
constituencies have ever engaged in genuine, good faith attempts to
negotiate a compromise. Why, one might ask, should opponents of
raising the age agree to negotiate when they have succeeded for
decades in perpetuating the status quo? Similarly, why should
politicians and lawmakers work towards comprehensive reform when
there is little evidence of public support?2 63 A large part of the
answer, confirmed by empirical studies on recidivism rates among
other indicators, lies in the long-term cost savings for North Carolina
in an era of budget shortfalls, prison overcrowding, and failed
criminal justice policies.2" The rest of the answer is perhaps best
expressed by raise-the-age advocates in Connecticut who have

for [the state] to recognize in law
asserted that "[t]he time has come
2 65
what it knows to be morally right.

263. But see supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing a recent national poll showing
that the public supports an individualized, case-by-case review before trying an offender
younger than eighteen in adult court).
264. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text (discussing how raising the age will
reduce recidivism and will ultimately be cost-effective); see also The Economic Impact of
Raising the Age of Juvenile Jurisdictionin Connecticut: Hearing on H.B. 5215 Before the
Judiciary and Appropriations Comm., Conn. Gen. Assemb. (Feb. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.urban.orgJUploadedPDF/900959-juvenile-jurisdiction-CT.pdf (statement of
John Roman, Justice Policy Center, Urban Institute) (testifying that moving sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds out of the adult system and into the juvenile system, while
maintaining all other services for youth as they are, would return approximately three
dollars in benefit for every one dollar in cost).
265. Testimony Supporting An Act Concerning the Age of a Child with Respect to
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Hearing on H.B. 6285 Before the Judiciary Comm., Conn.
Gen. Assemb., (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://www.ctkidslink.org/testimony/040407
judiciaryjuvage.pdf (statement of Theresa Sgobba, Shelley Geballe, and Mary Glassman,
Advocates for Connecticut's Children and Youth) (emphasis added).

